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Defenses in Dispute: The Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics of the First Anti-Ballistic
Missile Debate
Sam Lair
Introduction
On October 1st, 1975, the Stanley R. Mickelson Safeguard Complex became fully
operational. Located near Grand Forks, North Dakota, the complex was easily identifiable by a
large topless pyramid structure that housed a radar and dominated the surrounding area.1 This
radar, in conjunction with 100 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptors, had a specific mission:
defend the 150 Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) housed in
underground silos at Grand Forks Air Force Base from ballistic missile attack by the Soviet
Union. On October 2nd, 1975, the day after the Mickelson Safeguard Complex became fully
operational, the United States House of Representatives voted to shut it down. The Senate
echoed that measure, with slight modification, that November. By February of 1976—not even
six months after coming fully online—the Army had turned off the distinctive pyramidal radar
and started removing the interceptors and nuclear warheads from their cells. The radar structure
still stands today, a monument in stained concrete to the futility of the arms race.
The Safeguard Complex in North Dakota had a fleeting lifespan, but the ideas, debates,
and technologies it represented did not. This installation was the culmination of nearly twenty
years of intense effort, deliberation, and controversy over defending against the threat of ballistic
missiles. Beginning after World War II, efforts to respond to this novel danger accelerated under

1

See Figure 1 in Appendix.
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the Eisenhower administration prior to the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. The
system produced by this effort was called Nike-Zeus.
This anti-ballistic missile system was never deployed. It faced skepticism from the
Eisenhower administration, and first deferral and then dismissal from the Kennedy
administration. During the Johnson administration new technology and ideas yielded Nike-X, the
next generation of ABM system. Johnson’s cabinet and various agencies fought another pitched
battle over the question of whether and how to deploy Nike-X. This produced Sentinel in
September 1967, a system to defend the entire country from missile attack by the recently
nuclearized People’s Republic of China. Sentinel perished with the arrival of the Nixon
administration, which adopted a slightly modified version of the system that emphasized
defending the missile silos and bomber bases that comprised part of the United States’ strategic
nuclear deterrent. The Nixon administration rechristened this program Safeguard. These changes
did not save Safeguard from becoming the locus of debate in the halls of Congress and
negotiation with the Soviet Union at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In 1972, the
Nixon administration delivered the SALT I Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which
introduced significant limitations on missile defenses. In 1974, an additional protocol to that
treaty tightened those restrictions further, and the ABM Treaty became the bedrock of arms
control between the United States and Soviet Union for the next 30 years. In 1975, the Mickelson
Safeguard Complex, the only such installation allowed under the modified treaty, was
decommissioned.
The investment of so much money, energy, and thought into anti-ballistic missiles raise
the question of why the Mickelson complex was shut down so unceremoniously. Why, after such
a significant effort, did this happen and why was the process to reach that point such a shambles?

8

Many scholars present the story of the ABM debate as the logical and inexorable consequence of
the acceptance of deterrence theory and mutual vulnerability by the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
the ABM treaty suggesting that “consensus had been reached between Moscow and Washington
about the meaning of the nuclear age.”2 This view is prevalent among many political scientists
and strategic studies scholars, who predominantly understand this outcome as symbolizing “the
internment of BMD and the enshrinement of the strategy of the nuclear deterrence” and the
product of American and Soviet efforts “to control their arms race in nuclear weapons.”3 Other
scholars, such as James Cameron and Janne Nolan, acknowledge the significance of
technological developments and deterrence theory, but highlight the influence of domestic and
bureaucratic politics in explaining these outcomes. Cameron’s works exploring the impact of
domestic protests and the “perpetual presidential struggle” to “reconcile public pronouncements
regarding nuclear weapons with private doubts and competing domestic priorities, both political
and budgetary” are of particular importance and have significantly shaped this work.4
This project builds upon those efforts to complicate the arms race and deterrence theoryfocused narrative of early American ABM efforts. I argue that the combination of intense
interagency and intercabinet debates on ABM, synthesized with the peculiar domestic politics of
the arms race, led to the Mickelson Safeguard Complex’s ignoble fate in 1975. Examining
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A. Ford, “Anything but Simple: Arms Control and Strategic Stability,” in Strategic Stability: Contending
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disputes within the executive branch in the context of foreign policy and domestic politics can
help shed light on this process and how this resolution came about, making extensive use of
publicly available and declassified documents. Additionally, the efficacy or availability of
technology played a large role in deliberations over missile defense policy, even if this story does
not have a technological determinist lens. Different actors used existing or potential technology
to pursue and achieve different goals relating to missile defenses, and those systems are
explained in detail to add texture and richness to the debates over ABM.
There is a duality or tension to the domestic politics of this issue. On one hand, the way
Congress and public opinion interpreted the strategic arms competition, often reducing it to its
most vulgarly simplistic form of “keeping up with the Joneses,” manufactured pressures on the
Johnson administration for an ABM. On the other hand, implementation of that policy, the
product of those domestic pressures, met with fierce resistance and protests. The problems with
this fusion of intra-executive branch fights and domestic politics became more pronounced as
administrations changed, epitomized in the Nixon administration’s pivot from Sentinel to
Safeguard. Even if there was general agreement on the continued prosecution of the arms race
between administrations, the long-term nature of a project like an ABM system made it more
susceptible to changes which severely circumscribed its effectiveness and coherence.
Nuclear deterrence theory during the Cold War relied on the threat of nuclear destruction
to maintain the status quo, making the cost of an attack by either the United States or the Soviet
Union on the other far outweigh any potential benefits. The credibility of these threats hinged on
being able to deliver nuclear weapons to targets, and the vulnerability of each side. As the
superpowers developed new means of delivery, particularly ballistic missiles, for increasingly
sophisticated atomic weapons, an offensive arms race emerged. ABMs had a peculiar effect
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within nuclear deterrence and the arms race. While they could defend the United States against
ballistic missiles, they also reduced the credibility of the Soviet Union’s ability to deliver its
nuclear force to its targets. Moreover, if used in conjunction with a first strike, ABMs could
absorb the adversary’s “ragged retaliation” with the forces that survived the first strike, making
them an offensive as well as a defensive tool. This situation could provoke a massive buildup,
quantitative and qualitative, by the Soviets to rectify the imbalance, and outwit or oversaturate an
ABM. Secretary of Defense McNamara would term this the action/reaction phenomenon.
Therefore, anti-ballistic missiles added layers to the arms race, as it could no longer just be a
competition between offenses but had to be one between offenses and defenses as well. The
paradoxical nature of anti-ballistic missiles in nuclear deterrence permeates the debates described
here.
This granular, bureaucratic history of anti-ballistic missile systems and their surrounding
controversies during the early Cold War can help provide insight, not only into one of the most
important and formative nuclear weapons projects of the United States, but into contemporary
issues as well. Since the abrogation of the ABM treaty by the George W. Bush administration in
2002, missile defenses have once again risen to be one of the most prominent and problematic
issues in nuclear weapons and arms control, with policymakers dealing with their potential to
undermine deterrence. Clarifying and understanding the Cold War experience on this issue may
help policymakers navigate those challenges facing us today.
Missile Defenses and the Nike Family: 1940s-1957
The first serious attempt by the U.S. government at defending against ballistic missile
attacks was known as Nike-Zeus. Bell Telephone Laboratories developed Nike, a series of
mythically named missiles used for various defensive purposes, such as air defense, cruise
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missile defense, and, eventually, ballistic missile defense. The Nike program evolved from
Project Wizard; a study begun by the Army Air Force in 1946 at the University of Michigan
which investigated the possibility of using an interceptor traveling at 4,000 miles per hour to
intercept targets at altitudes of 60,000 to 500,000 feet.5 This basic concept, using an anti-missile
missile to destroy an adversary’s re-entry vehicle, was the bedrock for all future serious missile
defense efforts.
This is not to say the Nike family of missiles were the only efforts towards anti-ballistic
missile systems during this period. However, many of these other projects were closer to science
fiction than reality. Shortly after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the Advanced
Research Projects Agency at the Department of Defense started Project BAMBI. The name
derived from the central idea, ballistic missile boost intercept.6 There are broadly three phases of
flight for a ballistic missile. The boost phase, where the rocket engines are still burning as the
missile escapes the atmosphere, is followed by the midcourse phase, which takes place outside
the atmosphere and is the longest phase. After midcourse is the terminal phase, where the missile
re-entry vehicle re-enters the atmosphere at incredibly high speeds. The Minuteman I re-entry
vehicle, for example, reached speeds of around 17,000 miles per hour during the terminal phase.
For this reason, terminal defense against ICBMs is remarkably difficult. Re-entry vehicles house
the warhead of a ballistic missile, conventional or nuclear. Project BAMBI investigated
intercepting ballistic missiles while their engines were still burning in the boost phase. That

5

Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 6.
Donald R. Baucom, “Eisenhower and Ballistic Missile Defense: The Formative Years, 1944-1961,” Air Power
History 51, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 11, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26274602.
6
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would have required nuclear armed “high performance space-based platforms and interceptors”
to catch the missile before it transitioned from the boost phase to the midcourse phase.7
The project was appealing to those interested in nuclear warfighting capabilities. Air
Force Lt General J. H. Atkinson remarked that the “(BAMBI) concept, is the most pressing
requirement for an effective win-the-war strategy” and Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas
D. White stated, “the BAMBI concept may very well provide the technological breakthrough
which will help us retain a credible counter force capability during this decade.”8 However, there
were many issues with the program. One report from 1962 identified “investigations to date have
not established feasibility or firm values for design and operational parameters,” and that
“considerable additional research is required in a variety of areas before the technical,
operational, and economic feasibility of the BAMBI concept can be verified.”9 Although the
Kennedy Administration cancelled Project BABMI in 1963, this idea of space-based boost phase
defenses returned many times, in the guise of the Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as Star
Wars, and later Brilliant Pebbles, among others. While conceptually exciting, BAMBI and other
less feasible ideas made much less progress than the Nike program.
After World War Two, the military faced the problem of how to deal with the newly
emerging era of jet-powered fighters and bombers, which posed significant problems to

7
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8
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traditional anti-aircraft artillery systems. This conundrum resulted in the beginning of the Nike
family of missiles in 1945.10 There were many different iterations of Nike from the 1950s
through the 1970s. The first was Nike-Ajax, followed by -Hercules, -Zeus, and ultimately NikeX. Each version refined and changed the system to adapt to evolving threats. Enemy bombers at
increasingly higher speeds, altitudes, and larger quantities, and eventually ballistic missiles with
escalating degrees of sophistication, provoked the dramatic evolutionary arc of the Nike family.
In 1947 there was a major reorganization of the armed services, the National Security
Act of 1947, which saw the Air Force become an independent branch, separate from the Army.
The act also established the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
Importantly, the Army led the Nike-Ajax program, their first foray into surface-to-air missiles.
At the same time, the Army Air Forces, later the Air Force after 1947, pursued a similar system.
The Air Force program was initially known as the Ground-to-Air Pilotless Aircraft (GAPA), but
ultimately became the Bomarc.11 As Nike and Bomarc were both systems which could perform
largely the same role, continental air defense, they were competitors.
Post-war interservice rivalry and their similar role heavily influenced the contest between
Nike-Ajax and Bomarc. Both the Air Force and the Army sought total control over the role but
were plagued by the lack of clear division in responsibilities.12 After World War II, the Truman
Administration initiated a significant draw down in military forces, resulting in a concomitant
reduction in funding.13 Even though budgets rose as the Cold War developed, they were largely

10
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11
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directed to nuclear weapons, particularly with the Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on the
strategy of massive retaliation. Thus, much of the available funding was going to the Air Force
since the bombers of Strategic Air Command (SAC) were critical to the delivery of strategic
nuclear weapons. The Navy also managed to carve out a strategic role for itself by leveraging
carrier-based aircraft and later the Polaris ballistic missile submarine program.14 However, the
Army struggled in the post-war years to find a similar strategic nuclear role and had to fight to
find one throughout the 1950s.15 Therefore, the Army wanted a larger slice of the continental air
defense role to maintain its funding and relevancy, putting it at odds with the Air Force.
In this context, Nike-Ajax reflected the Army’s desire to get into the continental air
defense game and beat the Air Force’s competitor missile to do so. Convincing Congress and the
Defense Department of the superiority of Ajax over the Air Force’s Bomarc would be a big step
towards achieving that and securing a role for the Air Force. Ultimately, this effort was partially
successful, as more Nike than Bomarc batteries were procured for a number of reasons. The
simple design of the Nike and the use of solid fuel rocket motors for both the Ajax and the
Hercules made for a smoother research and development process.16 Particularly compared to the
Bomarc, which used a peculiar, winged design and changed from liquid to solid fuel between its
A and B iterations.17 Changing fuel types, a “huge technological leap,” and other problems
caused reliability issues, delays, and spiraling costs for Bomarc.18 Nevertheless, as the “bomber

14
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16
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gap” scare heated up in the mid-1950s, both systems would be deployed to defend against the
allegedly-vast Soviet bomber fleet.19 These circumstances helped establish the Army in the
continental air defense role, which it would later parley into the missile defense role.
Deployed beginning in 1953, the Nike-Ajax was supposed serve as point defense to
protect cities and military bases from bomber or cruise missile attacks.20 Those are largely
similar roles, as a cruise missile is essentially a plane with no pilot and some type of payload;
conventional explosive, nuclear, or otherwise.21 Ajax had a range of 25-30 miles and could reach
speeds of Mach 2.3, or 1,679 mph with its solid fuel rocket engine.22 To destroy incoming cruise
missiles or bombers before they reached their targets, the Nike-Ajax used a conventional
warhead, detonating in close proximity to its target.23
The warhead was one of the major changes made with the second Nike iteration, the
Hercules. Nike-Hercules was part of the second generation of U.S. surface-to-air missiles, using
most of the supporting components of the Ajax, adding more high-powered radars and three
more boosters and engines to the missile.24 The most significant change from Ajax to Hercules
was adding the capability to use either a conventional or nuclear warhead to intercept targets.
The nuclear warhead could increase the number of targets destroyed by an interceptor and reduce
the level of accuracy required for the radars and missiles. However, the nuclear warhead also
caused issues for the Eisenhower administration which resisted deployment. This was partially

19
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out of concern for civilians, who might have been jeopardized by interceptions using nuclear
weapons at altitudes as low as 30,000 feet.25 At such a low altitude, the heat, blast, shock, and
radiation effects of the nuclear detonation might harm civilians in the cities the system was
supposed to protect. The additional boosters and engines, which increased the range of the
Hercules to 75 miles and its speed to Mach 3.65 or 2,707 mph, were insufficient to resolve
criticism of the small area defended and questionable effectiveness.26 Nonetheless, by the end of
the 1950s Nike-Hercules batteries with their nuclear warheads were replacing Ajax batteries
across the United States, including in cities like Chicago, Boston, and Seattle, with “much
fanfare from local press and officials, but little protest from locals.”27
As the Hercules rollout began, however, doubt was cast on the premise of the “bomber
gap.” Suspicions about double counting or misreporting the number of bombers the Soviets had
and could produce were vindicated by a new Central Intelligence Agency program. The new U-2
spy plane was used to conduct secret flights over Soviet territory at incredibly high altitudes and
speeds to collect photographs of Soviet installations. With intelligence gleaned from the
photographs taken by the U-2s, the CIA was able to assess that the genuine number of Soviet
bombers was dramatically lower than had been reported. No sooner had the “bomber gap” been
debunked, and Congress began to question the necessity of newly deployed and expensive air
defense systems like Nike-Hercules, did a new threat arise.28

25

Cameron, The Double Game, 21.
“Nike Hercules (SAM-N-25) (MIM-14/14A/14B),” Federation of American Scientists, accessed December 10,
2021, https://nuke.fas.org/guide/usa/airdef/nike-hercules.htm.
27
James Cameron, “From the Grass Roots to the Summit: The Impact of US Suburban Protest on US MissileDefence Policy, 1968-1972,” The International History Review 36, (March 2014): 345-346,
https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.864693.
28
Chun, “Winged interceptor,” 53-54.
26

17

The launch of Sputnik in October 1957 by the Soviet Union, and the implied ability to
use ballistic missiles to strike intercontinental targets with nuclear weapons, stoked feelings of
fear and vulnerability among Americans.29 There had already been a sense of international
anxiety from the Cold War and the First Taiwan Straits Crisis from 1954-55. However, 1957 and
1958 compounded this perception with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev squeezing Berlin and
the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis.30 The late 1950s was a period when the United States felt
increasingly under pressure, exacerbated in the nuclear and technological realm by Sputnik.
Khrushchev did not help matters, with Pravda reporting he claimed the Soviet Union was
“turning out missiles like sausages.”31 Concerns of inferiority in the arms race in this moment
eventually translated into dramatic overcompensation in the nuclear force structure of the United
States.
New concerns about Soviet technological superiority in ICBMs combined with the
relaxed public response from the Republican Eisenhower Administration posed an opportunity
for Democrats. The narrative of the “missile gap” emerged, which held the Soviet Union had a
commanding qualitative and quantitative lead, particularly in ICBMs, over the United States, and
the Eisenhower administration had done little to prevent or redress the situation. This argument
was tested against the Republicans during the 1958 midterm elections to great success,
contributing to significant gains by Democrats that year.32 The Democrats saw a potential
winning coalition based in part on a military build up to eliminate the alleged “missile gap” and
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thus energize the economy, which crystallized in the successful 1960 presidential election of
John F. Kennedy. This shift occurred despite the persistent assertions of the Eisenhower
Administration that the U.S. still maintained a significant lead in the arms race.33
The “missile gap” and Sputnik, however, were far from the first-time concerns had been
raised about ICBMs in the U.S. and the Eisenhower Administration. Deterrence and Survival in
the Nuclear Age, more commonly known as the Gaither Report, demonstrates this. While it was
published in November of 1957, shortly after Sputnik, the panel was established in April of that
year. The Gaither Report underscored that the Soviets had “probably surpassed us in ICBM
development.”34 It was more concerned that “active defense programs now in being and
programmed for the future will not give adequate assurance of protection to the civil population”
and that current passive defenses would “afford no significant protection to the civil
population.”35 The distinction between active and passive defenses is important and pervasive to
the discussion of missile defense. Passive defenses include fallout shelters, hardening missile
silos or air bases, and defense through mobility, such as the Minuteman on rails concept or the
various MX basing modes studied in the 1970s. These are different from active defenses which
actively interdict the incoming threat, either shooting down bombers and cruise missiles, or
intercepting missile re-entry vehicles. In addition to enhanced early warning, hardening of bases,
and dramatic expansion of ICBM, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), and
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) programs, the Gaither Report recommended using

33

Ibid.
U.S. Office of Defense Mobilization, Science Advisory Committee, Security Resources Panel, "Deterrence and
Survival in the Nuclear Age, [Gaither Report],” 4, November 7, 1975, National Security Council Files 5724 (2), Policy
Papers Sub-Series, box 22, National Security Council Series, Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
35
Ibid, 5.
34

19

Nike-Zeus batteries to defend SAC bases and initiating “a program to develop and install an area
defense against ICBMs at the earliest possible date.”36 The report further predicted that ABM
would be the next phase of the arms race, arguing that in the first half of the 1970s “missiles in
turn will be made more sophisticated to avoid destruction; and there will be a continuing race
between the offense and the defense. Neither side can afford to lag or fail to match the other’s
moves.”37 The concern about the competition between offenses and defenses, with each side
reacting to the other, and the consequences of this new front in the arms race, were enduring.
The Eisenhower Administration attempted to keep the Gaither Report and its conclusions
a secret. Eisenhower considered many of the recommendations unwarranted and unreasonably
costly, largely based on intelligence the Gaither Committee did not have access to.38 This
privileged information helps explain his restrained response to Sputnik and the “missile gap.”
Restraint, however, was lacking in other quarters after Sputnik. The conclusions of the Gaither
report were leaked to the press and mobilized by the armed forces and those who wanted more
defense spending to pressure for new programs.39 In particular, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson
from Washington pounced on the opportunity, calling for more bomber and missile production.40
Washington was home to many defense industries, and Jackson went on to become one of the
most ardent proponents of missile defense in Congress.
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On the technical side, in 1955, Bell Laboratories began the Nike II study, commissioned
by Army Ordinance.41 Bell was to investigate a possible “common anti-aircraft defense system to
cover all future high-altitude threats,” with the Army later shifting the study’s emphasis to
defending against ballistic missiles.42 The report, finished in 1956, reached remarkably durable
conclusions about ballistic missile defense. It disregarded mid-course intercept due to economic
and feasibility concerns since it would require very early acquisition of the enemy missile and
“necessitate a defensive missile as formidable as the offensive weapon.”43 Moreover, it identified
the difficulty of discriminating the re-entry vehicles from decoys and chaff, and the importance
of atmospheric drag for filtering those out.44 The report recommended using multiple types of
interceptors, and multiple different radars as well, qualities which would eventually be
incorporated into Nike-X.45 Interestingly, much of the work done for the report was also shared
with the Air Force, who had also commissioned an anti-ICBM study from Bell, but with much
less funding.46
The Nike II study culminated in a February 1957 decision by the Army to begin
development of what would become Nike-Zeus at Bell Labs.47 While Nike-Zeus could still
defend against air threats, it was the first anti-ballistic missile system developed by the U.S. It
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had three stages, each with a solid fuel rocket engine, and a range of about 75-100 miles.48 49
Zeus was designed to use the W-5 nuclear warhead with a high-yield of 400 kilotons to destroy
incoming enemy warheads above the atmosphere.50 Despite Nike-Zeus’s myriad deficiencies,
some of which will be outlined below, it is important to remember it was the state of the art. Its
susceptibility to larger or more sophisticated attacks as well as simple penetration aids reflects
the difficulty of the anti-ballistic missile mission as much as the failings of the system.
Ultimately, Nike-Zeus was the main potential answer to Soviet ICBMs because it was building
on the established foundation of the Ajax and Hercules and was the most advanced project
available when Sputnik and the “missile gap” threw those concerns into the limelight.
Defense systems like the Nike family and other programs rely on many diverse types of
radars to operate successfully. Acquisition radars surveil a defended airspace and identify
incoming threats like bombers, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile re-entry vehicles (RVs).51
Once a target is identified, more advanced systems like Nike-Zeus or Nike-X would use
discrimination radars to focus on individual objects in the threat cloud and attempt to filter out
decoys or non-threatening objects.52 Acquisition radars would use lower frequencies which
would travel further, with some even extending over the horizon, whereas discrimination radars
would use higher frequencies which provide better resolution and detail but cannot propagate as

48

Graham Spinardi, “The rise and fall of Safeguard: anti‐ballistic missile technology and the Nixon Administration,”
History and Technology 26, no. 4 (2014): 315. https://doi.org/10.1080/07341512.2010.523174.
49
United States Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, “Assessment
of Ballistic Missile Defense Program,” Secret Report, April 17, 1961, DNSA, Doc ID: 1679150838.
https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/assessment-ballistic-missile-defenseprogram/docview/1679150838/se-2?accountid=7103 (accessed November 4, 2021): Appendix II
50
John E. Pike, Bruce G. Blair, and Steven I. Schwartz, “Defending against the Bomb,” in Atomic Audit: The Costs
and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 284285.
51
Bell Laboratories, ABM Research and Development at Bell Laboratories, I-5.
52
Ibid, 1-9.

22

far. Specific radars such as the PAR, MAR, and MSR, pertinent to Nike-X and its permutations,
will be discussed later.
The acquisition radars for Nike-Ajax, -Hercules, and -Zeus used a mechanically steered
radar array. This involved the “familiar rotating antenna fan” which had to be physically turned
using a mechanical assembly to identify and track contacts.53 Mechanically steering a radar is
inefficient and time consuming, meaning the radar can only track a very limited number of
targets.54 Therefore, the early Nike radars could very easily be oversaturated by an attacker,
sending more bombers, missiles, re-entry vehicles, or decoys than the radar could handle,
ensuring it would miss some and they would get through. There were also issues with the ability
of the Ajax radars to discriminate between bombers or other targets in groups, setting the stage
for future efforts to improve the volume of targets radars could manage as well as their
resolution.55
During the Nike-Zeus research and development program, some of the first phased-array
radar studies were conducted by Bell and other supporting laboratories, culminating in tests
which “verified on a full-scale basis the satisfactory performance of a multifunction array radar
in a real target environment.”56 These projects were incredibly demanding work, as one
researcher who led the Lincoln Laboratory Special Radars Group at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology noted. He remarked that “as the demands continue to grow, the radar designer is
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forced into ever conflicting requirements, such as the simultaneous need for larger, more precise
antennas, and for faster scanning until he is led to consider approaches so radical as to have been
considered impractical in the light of previous demands.”57 Nonetheless, the development of
electronically phased array radars and other discrimination efforts in Project Defender would
help resolve many of these issues and would play a role in the defeat of Nike-Zeus in favor of
Nike-X by Secretary McNamara in the Kennedy administration.58
In addition to being unable to manage a large number of targets and distinguish between
genuine re-entry vehicles and decoys, these systems were rather soft or vulnerable. This was
especially true of the radars. They were delicate, and could not withstand much punishment,
especially in a conflict where nuclear weapons were used. A report by the Presidential Science
Advisory Committee (PSAC) estimated that the Nike-Zeus radar could only withstand 2 psi of
overpressure, making it susceptible to near-miss nuclear detonations concluding that at the time
there was “no known way to obtain a really hard antenna system.”59 For comparison, the “Little
Boy” bomb which destroyed Hiroshima with a yield of 15 kilotons produced 2 psi to a radius of
almost 3 kilometers, so it would not take much of a near miss to destroy one of these radars using
contemporary weapons which had much higher yields.60 The PSAC report’s recommendation
was to continue research and development with the goal of deployment, emphasizing higher
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frequency radars, radar hardening, and investigation of the effects of very-high-altitude
detonations of high-yield weapons.61
Another persistent conundrum for both Nike-Zeus and other ABM systems that used
nuclear weapons to kill their targets was blackouts. This refers to the deleterious effect nuclear
explosions in space or in the atmosphere have on radar performance. The explosions could
produce fireballs and “a sheet of ionized air,” both of which “cause reflection or absorption of
radar waves for a ten-minute period.”62 Even after the ten-minute period, lingering nuclear
effects would bend radar beams, changing where objects were assessed to be, similar to how
light refracts in water.63 Therefore, a clever attacker would detonate some of their warheads in
space or in the atmosphere to generate these effects and blind the defenses, making interception
enormously difficult. However, since the defensive interceptors also used nuclear warheads, the
explosions they generated to try and kill enemy RVs would also generate the same effects. This
was noted in the PSAC report, which concluded “the problems of attenuation and refraction
which may result from high altitude nuclear detonations, including those of the Nike-Zeus
warhead itself, was considered a serious problem.”64 The problem of blackouts, both fratricidal
and from the enemy, plagued missile defense efforts and remained one of the most common
technical criticisms of nuclear based ABM systems through the Cold War and beyond.
Intriguingly, Nike-Zeus also filled a role beyond ABM and defense against high-altitude
threats. A 1960 report for the NSC Planning Board argued that “we must anticipate a marked
increase in the exploitation of space for military purposes,” including bombing systems,
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“reconnaissance, navigation, early warning and communication.”65 Therefore, the “capability to
destroy orbiting satellites and space vehicles” would be crucial to accomplishing that mission.66
Beginning in early 1962, the Army asked Bell Labs to prepare for testing Nike-Zeus against
satellite targets, with tests against points in space occurring that December.67 A full scale
interception of an actual satellite was performed on May 23, 1963, at Kwajalein, with the
interceptor getting close enough to have destroyed the target with a genuine warhead.68 The Bell
Laboratories history of its ABM program noted that, from May 1963 until 1964, “satelliteintercept missiles were maintained at Kwajalein with one always checked out and in a state of
readiness.”69 However, the tests continued with eight Nike-Zeus missiles fired as part of the test
program, until it was canceled in 1967 in preference for the Thor based anti-satellite weapon.70
Zeus’ role as an ASAT is significant, as it began the tradition of missile defense systems
also fulfilling a dual-use role as anti-satellite weapons, whether explicitly stated or not. This was
also true for Safeguard. When discussing potential roles for Safeguard, a 1970 Verification Panel
report noted the system could be used to “provide a means to track and destroy most space
vehicles such as post-attack reconnaissance satellites.”71The implicit capability of the United
States to conduct attacks on satellites, which are often used for early warning of attack or
command and control, adds immense complexity and risk to confrontations with other nuclear
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armed powers, then and now. Moreover, the implicit, rather than explicit, nature of this
capability encourages suspicion, distrust, and fear of this kind of program in other states. This
trend of ABM systems also being ASAT systems has been true for every U.S. ABM which
intercepts its target outside of the atmosphere, including the modern Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense and the Aegis-based Standard Missile-3 systems.
Ike’s Interceptors: 1958-1960
Upon taking office, Eisenhower moved away from the massive expenditures of
containment based on documents such as NSC-68 by making new alliances and relying more on
nuclear weapons to maintain superior military force, while also cutting the conventional forces
and costs which he feared would undermine the long-term viability of the U.S. from within.72
This strategy, called the New Look, also included avoiding large land wars like Korea while also
undertaking a moral offensive against the Soviets.73 In the context of the New Look, the
Eisenhower administration’s decision on Nike Zeus aligned with their goals of reducing
spending, emphasizing offensive nuclear weapons through massive retaliation, and cutting
inefficiencies.
In 1958, however, the deficiencies of Nike-Zeus outlined in the previous section were
still being teased out, and the government was grappling with genuine concerns over the
vulnerability of U.S. cities and forces. As early as February of that year, five months after
Sputnik, the Eisenhower administration was discussing ABM and Nike-Zeus. More specifically,
they were considering various options for defending Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the
United States from ICBM attack. While Nike-Zeus was still far from an initial operational
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capability, there were conversations about “whether to utilize modified existing anti-aircraft
missiles (Talos) as interim defense against ICBM attack at SAC bases, pending the development
of an initial operational capability of the more effective Nike–Zeus anti-missile missiles.”74
The Eisenhower administration’s concern and shifting defense priorities were reflected in
the budget as well. In June of 1959 while deciding the budget for Fiscal Year 1960, the President
decided to accelerate Nike-Zeus by providing “an additional $150 million under consideration”
for the program.75 True to Eisenhower’s penchant for fiscal conservatism and balancing the
budget, bolstering the anti-ballistic missile budget was accompanied by a cut to continental antiaircraft defenses. This pivot was explicit, highlighting that the changes were made because “the
threat from Soviet bombers has changed with the reduced estimates of numbers of bombers, and
because Soviet long-range missiles are becoming the dominant threat.”76
As money shifted within the continental defense mission, interagency rivalry again reared
its head. The Army established control over anti-aircraft missiles for defense during the early and
mid-1950s, such that “air defense is now split, and the Army is in fact initiating many activities
with missiles to do a job formerly done only by tactical air.”77 Yet, there was consternation
among the other services over the funding which would now go to the Army for anti-missile

74

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and
Disarmament, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David W. Mabon (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1996), Document 9, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d9, (accessed January 13,
2022).
75
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and
Disarmament, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David W. Mabon (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1996), Document 59, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d59, (accessed January 13,
2022).
76
Ibid.
77
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and
Disarmament, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David W. Mabon (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1996), Document 65, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d65, (accessed January 13,
2022).

28

defense. There was some contention between the Army and Air Force over this division of labor,
showcased by Eisenhower’s suggestion that the Chiefs of the Army and Air Force consider
“trading some responsibilities—for example, giving the whole air defense mission to Air Force
units, and tactical air operations to Army units.”78 Complaints from the Navy reflected their
emerging minimum deterrence philosophy that relatively few invulnerable nuclear weapons were
sufficient to deter an adversary. Admirals expressed “concern” over Nike-Zeus, since it “will be
extremely advanced, complicated and expensive and will require wide dispersion.”79 Admiral
Radford argued “the money should be used in other places, for example in modernizing certain
equipment of the Army and the Navy.”80 This lack of unity at the Joint Chiefs of Staff increased
the flexibility of the civilian government regarding defense procurement and decision making
since they could play the Chiefs off against each other and were not faced with an undivided
military opinion. While the Chiefs would eventually band together to present a unified front
during Robert McNamara’s tenure as Secretary of Defense, it was not before their discord aided
in the mothballing of Nike-Zeus.
By the end of 1959, administration opinion on the “more effective Nike-Zeus” was
shifting. Establishing a pattern, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, with the advice of physicists
and science advisors Dr. Herbert York and Dr. George Kistiakowsky, announced at a National
Security Council meeting that “there were too many uncertainties to proceed to the manufacture
of Nike–Zeus” even though it “was the only “near time” active defense possibility against
missiles.”81 Instead, research and development for Zeus would continue, with $237 million
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allocated for FY 1961. This decision was based on some of those deficiencies discussed above,
namely decoys, with Secretary McElroy remarking “there was nothing to prevent an incoming
missile from emitting twenty decoys in such a way as to make it impossible for the Nike–Zeus to
discriminate.”82 He concluded that for Nike-Zeus “to be successful against a decoy system,
would require an enormous number of missiles.”83 A DOD study the following year supported
this assessment and outlined how “The ZEUS system is designed to launch 3 missiles against
each threatening target to achieve high probability of kill.”84 A discussion between Dr.
Kistiakowsky and Eisenhower in January of 1960 reinforced these conclusions. They discussed
recent PSAC reports which argued that “even if it performs according to expectations, is not a
worthwhile investment,” and it would be ten times cheaper to add more missile sites than defend
existing sites with Zeus.85 Moreover, if Zeus was used to defend the population, enemy warheads
could be detonated upwind outside of their range, killing cities with radioactive fallout rather
than an explosion.86 Therefore, an extensive fallout shelter program would have to be jointly
undertaken with Zeus deployments for population defense.
Yet, even if Zeus was not very effective, it still had staunch advocates. The January 1960
meeting also highlighted that “in the Army there seems to be a sharp split on the issue of our
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[PSAC’s] recommendations; people lower in the echelons, who have had an opportunity to look
into the technical factors involved, agree with our recommendations, but top echelons are most
unhappy about them.”87 These Army higher-ups who supported deploying Nike-Zeus were
buttressed by others such as Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon. These ABM advocates saw
the program as providing the only available defense against an expanding threat and generally
enhancing U.S. nuclear posture relative to the Soviet Union.88
In a September 1960 meeting, in which Eisenhower remarked “that for the last twenty
minutes he had been making up his mind to go into training as an Indian and live on deer in the
Rocky Mountains,” Dillon made an argument which would come to be incredibly familiar across
administrations.89 Dillon referenced the Soviet anti-ICBM effort, contending “if the Soviets
demonstrated the ability to destroy an incoming missile and we could not demonstrate a similar
ability, the psychological power and prestige of the Soviets would be greatly increased,” thus,
the United States should develop the capability to perform such a demonstration.90 Eisenhower
approved of a study on the issue, adding that if a demonstration were to occur, it should include
the press and potentially foreign officials, but that improving passive defenses and offensive
nuclear forces took precedence.91 Nonetheless, the decision referenced the “great psychological
effect which would result from a demonstration by either the U.S. or the USSR.”92 The
psychological impact of only one side in the Cold War having an ABM or the effect of a test
87

Ibid.
Ibid; United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary, “Department of Defense Report to National
Security Council on Status of United States Military Programs as of 30 June 1960,” 72.
89
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and
Disarmament, eds. Edward C. Keefer and David W. Mabon (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1996), Document 120, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d120, (accessed January 13,
2022).
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
88

31

would become common arguments deployed by ABM advocates during the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations, and reflected the competitive and sometimes highly illogical aspects of
the arms race. Regardless of the defenses of Nike-Zeus by its proponents, its deployment was
deferred in favor of more research and development, leaving it up to the next administration to
determine what to do with the program.
The intercabinet and interagency debates of the Eisenhower administration produced a
reasonable outcome, and Zeus’ opponents used sound arguments about cost and effectiveness to
cut through the pressure for deployment. However, this was done despite the public outcry over
narratives like the “missile gap” and the domestic politics of the arms race, which did have
consequences for Republicans in elections. Each of the later administrations examined here were
much more attentive to how the public saw the arms race, make the Eisenhower administration
unique in their decision-making on ABM. Insulating the administration’s decision-making from
largely manufactured public fears as well as the as well as the relative weakness of ABM
advocates, particularly the Joint Chiefs, helped produced a thoughtful decision not to deploy
Zeus in the Eisenhower administration.
Rationality or a Lack Thereof?: 1961
The Kennedy administration’s New Frontier sought a return to pragmatism and idealism
while embracing the basic principles of containment.93 This was coupled with a broad offensive
against the foreign policy conduct of the Cold War on every front during the election, of which
the “missile gap” was but a part.94 The new administration sought to rebuild conventional forces
and enhance nuclear options to provide a “flexible response,” as opposed to the decision-making
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straitjacket they perceived massive retaliation to be.95 As part of this, they incorporated much
youthful enthusiasm into government, particularly in the defense and nuclear weapons sectors
with the famed “whiz kids” or “wizards” from Research and Development (RAND), the Air
Force’s independent think tank, and elsewhere. One of the most consequential changes was
Robert McNamara, the new Secretary of Defense. When Kennedy was initially looking for
candidates for the position, Boeingcrat Senator Henry Jackson suggested Paul Nitze who had
been director of policy planning at the State Department under Truman and had worked on the
Strategic Bombing Survey after World War Two.96 While at State, Nitze had been instrumental
in formulating NSC-68, a policy paper outlining various strategies to deal with the Soviet
Union.97 The incredibly hawkish perspective, arguing that the Soviet Union was bent on world
domination, and vast military buildup prescribed to combat global communism in NCS-68 likely
reflected Nitze’s enduring beliefs about the Cold War and military policy.98 Nitze was a
controversial figure with some eccentric ideas, including the development of a “love gas” that,
when sprayed over the Soviet Union and the Kremlin, would induce more peaceful and loving
attitudes in those exposed.99 While Nitze would not get the role, as Kennedy favored McNamara
who had fewer links to the contemporary defense establishment, he was a recurring figure,
characterized by his staunch anti-communism and interest in the role nuclear weapons played in
the Cold War.
On the other hand, McNamara’s military experience came from helping manage the
logistics of the allied strategic bombing campaign in Europe during World War II. Afterwards,
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he took a position at Ford Motor Company, and rapidly moved up the ranks, becoming president
of the company before being tapped to head the Department of Defense. McNamara was known
for being an experienced bureaucrat and cool technocrat who would viciously fight for power
from his position. McNamara wanted to bring the efficient and rationalizing approach to
management he had used at Ford to the Defense Department. This included the inauguration of a
new budgeting system and an emphasis on systems analysis to evaluate the value of proposed
programs.100 McGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,
complained about the system the administration faced upon arrival, in which “the total figures of
any one of half a dozen of the weapons systems which are cheerfully proposed” by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, which needed to be cut down.101 That attitude was compounded, in Bundy’s
opinion, by “the present tendency of each service to think as if it were responsible for the whole
of the national defense,” further exacerbating budgetary problems.102 McNamara moved away
from this old system where the services set their own requirements for forces and weapons, as he
did not trust them to do this rationally, requiring justifications based on thorough predictions
running years into the future.103 Many, including David Bell, the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget who played a decisive role in the outcome of the 1961 debate about Nike-Zeus, praised
this new attitude.104 This approach established an unprecedented level of civilian involvement in
military planning and procurement during McNamara’s tenure.105
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The new emphasis on rationalization and prediction faced an early challenge from NikeZeus during the crafting of the Fiscal Year 1963 budget in 1961. This budget was significant for
the Kennedy administration and McNamara as it was the first they had complete control over to
implement their approach to military programming, setting priorities for 1963-67.106 Many
thought the dilemma over the production and deployment of Nike-Zeus was one of the central
questions which had to be answered in this budget.107 There had been little change in the
effectiveness or reliability of the system since the Eisenhower administration decided not to
deploy due to its price tag, and the evidence presented to the new administration seemed to lie in
favor of continuing this policy emphasis on research and development for missile defense. It
would not have been surprising to see such an ineffective program on the chopping block under
the new regime of rationality.
Early in the fall of 1961, McNamara, with JCS support, favored funds for “Nike-Zeus
production support” to make a “limited deployment in the near future” possible.108 He noted,
however, “a purely technical appraisal would not lead to a recommendation for deployment of a
weapon system with so limited an operational effectiveness.”109 This technical assessment was
echoed by Defense Research and Engineering studies that spring which concluded that despite at
least $2 billion spent thus far, prospects for a defense against Soviet ICBMs were “bleak.”110 The
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report elaborated on the issues with Zeus discussed above, such as decoys and their significant
effect on the systems range, the soft radars vulnerable to a single warhead, blackouts, and
susceptibility to saturation attacks.111 General Maxwell Taylor, then the President’s Military
Representative and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reached the “The inescapable
conclusion” that “for the foreseeable future, attacking ICBM missiles will have inherent
technological and economic advantages and tactical flexibility,” making ABM “at best a
tremendously expensive venture of dubious effectiveness.”112 The continued technical problems
Zeus faced were accompanied by intelligence developments which threw the system’s necessity
into question as well.
During this period, the character of the Soviet threat came into focus for the new
administration. New National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) produced that September drastically
reevaluated the Soviet ICBM threat. One NIE included a “sharp downward revision in our
estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength” to only 10-25 launchers, with potentially 75-125 in
mid-1963.113 This was a dramatic decline from previous predictions and makes some military
requests from this period, such as the Air Force’s desired 10,000 Minuteman ICBMs, seem
gratuitous. Nonetheless, the NIE concluded that “while the present ICBM force poses a grave
threat to a number of US urban areas, it represents only a limited threat to US-based nuclear
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striking forces.”114 The continuing and varied problems with Nike-Zeus, combined with a
reduced threat from the Soviet ICBM force should have been sufficient to preclude a decision to
produce or deploy Nike-Zeus in the first year of McNamara’s rationality regime.
But it was not. McNamara, ultimately recommended for the FY 1963 budget not only
continued research and development for Nike-Zeus, but a limited deployment of 12 Nike-Zeus
batteries to defend 6 cities with a total of 1,200 interceptors as well.115 The classic arguments
favoring ABM deployment, such as defending the population, stopping accidental attacks or
those from a “secondary power,” were all made, but did not appear to weather the technical and
cost criticisms.116 McNamara explicitly recognized that the lack of technical merit in the system
argued against deployment, indicating the real reasoning lay elsewhere.117 Rather, this decision
came about through a combination of factors from both inside and outside the administration.
These included the possibility of an equivalent Soviet system, pressure from Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, the hawkish tone of the presidential campaign, and the state of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. This dynamic produced the half-hearted endorsement of Zeus within the administration
during 1961.
A large factor in this outcome, and future U.S. decisions on missile defense, was the
possibility that the U.S.S.R. would develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense system before
the United States could or would. The military and psychological components of the arms race
made this a significant issue. This concern was justified based on National Intelligence Estimates
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(NIE) which assessed “the Soviets will continue to put a great deal of research effort into
antimissile defense.”118 Even though the CIA was “unable to predict what success [the Soviets]
may have,” the report concluded that “sometime between 1963 and 1966 an antiballistic missile
system, employing surface-to-air missiles, could become operational for use in fixed
defenses.”119 The NIE emphasized the military aspect of a lead in missile defenses, noting a
“tremendous strategic advantage would accrue to the side which achieved such a defense before
its adversaries.”120 However, the military advantages of such a situation were not the only
inducement, especially in all-encompassing superpower competition of the Cold War, even if it
would accelerate the arms race.
As demonstrated by Undersecretary Dillon’s position during the Eisenhower
administration’s debates over the issue of ABM, many policymakers firmly believed in the
psychological elements of the arms race, and the influence it could have on the outcome of
superpower competition. In the Kennedy administration, the strongest proponent of what I will
call the “psychology argument” was Secretary of State Dean Rusk. A former president of the
Rockefeller Foundation, he was “the quintessential representative of U.S. liberalism in foreign
and domestic affairs.”121 Rusk was “an idealistic neo-Wilsonian who “gave priority to
considerations of power and security to combat Communist aggressors, hoping that once the
United States successfully prosecuted the Cold War, international law and justice would rule the
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world.”122 Rusk argued that if the Soviets got a functional ABM in the period forecasted by
available intelligence, “it would afford them an opportunity for exerting immense pressures on
the Western Alliance,” exerting a “psychological impact on allies and even conceivably on the
U.S. public.”123 It could even be “sufficient to encourage [the Soviet Union] into launching
increasingly aggressive policies,” Rusk postulated.124 He railed against the more tentative
proposal which ultimately made it into the budget, remarking “the limited, time-lagging effort
cannot help but be viewed as a clear indication of U.S. impotence in this field.”125 According to
Rusk, the U.S. must retain an advantage over the Soviets in this field as falling behind risked
demoralizing allies, the government, and the population, to the detriment of the general effort.
The relative potency of ABM systems aside, the concern for the psychological facet of
the arms race was shared, to an extent, by General Taylor. He was satisfied with a limited
deployment, suggesting it would do “something to offset any psychological gains the Soviets
might achieve from their announcement of an anti-ICBM.”126 However, Taylor also injected
some much-needed nuance to the psychological argument. He warned there were “past
expressions of pessimism to offset if we are to get a solid psychological return” from deployment
and production of the deficient Zeus, requiring an outpouring of optimism from the
administration if they did decide to proceed.127 Moreover, there was “a danger that public
opinion would occasion a runaway on the part of the program,” creating undue faith in the
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efficacy of the program. These fears were shared by McNamara, who warned that the Executive
and Congressional branches, as well as the general populace, “may develop an unwarranted faith
in its capability to deter a Soviet attack or to mitigate its consequences if full-scale nuclear
warfare is initiated.”128 McNamara and Taylor recognized the “psychology argument” could cut
both ways, buoying morale yet encouraging reckless policy based on the incorrect assumption
that ABM would insulate leaders from negative consequences.
The concern about the relative strength of nuclear arsenals and the potential blowback
associated with falling behind expressed in the “psychology argument” rhymed with the rhetoric
deployed by the Democrats and Kennedy during the 1960 presidential and 1958 midterm
campaigns. The hawkish platform, even if divorced from the reality of strategic force
composition, may have forced the administration’s hand somewhat. It would have been difficult
to sell the public and portions of Congress on a more restrained approach to the arms race
considering the previous statements of the incoming administration. Even by March of 1961,
many in the administration had recognized this. McGeorge Bundy acknowledged the inaccuracy
of the “missile gap,” but emphasized the need to distinguish their new military policy from that
of the Eisenhower administration.129 To shed the general malaise described by Kennedy on the
campaign trail, of which the “missile gap” was but one component, large injections of funding
and new crash programs for nuclear weapons were necessary.130 This attitude might have
influenced the decision to recommend the partial deployment of Nike-Zeus.
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A further complicating factor in this process was the division at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Each service considering themself as the sole protector of the nation, as Bundy noted, meant
there was no unified constituency for Zeus at the highest levels of the military. Even though
NORAD, and likely the Army, supported a more expansive 70 battery program, the Joint Chiefs
ultimately concurred with McNamara’s more tepid proposal of limited deployment.131 The
fragmented state of the JCS on this issue would be highlighted in more detail during the
continued debates on the issue in 1962.
The integration of the pressure to live up to campaign promises, concerns about the
psychology of deterrence from Rusk, as well as a lack of pressure from the JCS, contributed to
McNamara recommending the middle ground of limited deployment, rather than full scale or no
deployment. At this point, however, the Chekov’s Gun of David Bell and the Bureau of the
Budget fired. The Bureau struck down the funding for deployment, citing Zeus’s “manifest
inadequacy” and the need to present Congress with a balanced budget.132 Further suggesting the
halfhearted and possibly reticent character of McNamara’s recommendation, the funding request
for the 6 city 12 battery option was dropped during a meeting December 9th, leaving the issue to
be taken up again the following year.133
The messiness of 1961’s decision points towards the difficulties which will pervade
ABM debates going forward. Different parties involved in decision-making on ABM had
different agendas and goals, which made reaching consensus difficult, as more confounding
factors were added to the process. The domestic politics of the arms race, especially after
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Kennedy’s “missile gap” campaign position, and the administration’s general interest in nuclear
warfighting at the time, helped move a deployment proposal forward. However, when put in
conflict with other priorities, such as technical efficacy or the budget, the proposal was first
circumscribed and then run aground. The less decisive, more confused conclusion of the debate
over Zeus that year reflected the administration’s own lack of consensus on the issue, and
ultimately deferred definitive answers to the issue.
Things Fall Apart: Nike-Zeus and 1962
Nike-Zeus remained one of the most significant defense questions to be resolved by
policymakers in 1962. Even though the Budget Bureau had defeated a deployment decision in
the eleventh hour the year before, many of the same factors played into policymaker’s
deliberations about Nike-Zeus for the next budget cycle. Increasing coordination among the Joint
Chiefs, continued pressure from Rusk and the adherents of the “psychology argument,” and new
intelligence about Soviet ABM efforts inflated the impulses towards deployment. However,
McNamara and others capitalized on the continued inadequacy of Nike-Zeus, new technological
developments and concepts, and the administration’s experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis to
finally end discussions about deploying Zeus.
The Cuban Missile Crisis looms large over discussions of the evolving thinking about
nuclear weapons in the Kennedy administration, during and after 1962. Lawrence Freedman and
Jeffrey Michaels, for example, argue in their history of nuclear strategy that the crisis was a
“turning point,” triggering “a change in the political and intellectual climate,” and that the
counter-force strategy “had proved to be irrelevant.”134 Janne Nolan and James Cameron have
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reached similar conclusions, with Cameron noting that “outside the seminar room, the cool
attitude exhibited by nuclear strategists toward the manipulation of the risk of an intercontinental
exchange melted” reflecting the “all-consuming fear of nuclear confrontation that characterized
the Kennedy administration’s approach to nuclear weapons.”135 This produced intense
skepticism about the utility of nuclear superiority in a crisis among those Americans involved,
especially McNamara who began to see Soviet advances in the arms race as the reciprocal
negative consequence of certain U.S. force deployments.136 McNamara later articulated these
concerns about Soviet insecurity as the “action/reaction” phenomenon, one of the most
significant concepts in the debates over ABM and force structure in the Johnson and Nixon
administrations. The Soviets largely drew the opposite conclusion from the events of that
October, feeling U.S. nuclear superiority had limited their actions and forced them to the
bargaining table.137 This interpretation fueled the large Soviet ICBM buildup after the crisis,
which would play a major role in the Nixon administration’s initial decisions on ABM at the end
of the 1960s.138
The Cuban Missile Crisis had a clearly monumental impact on the way the administration
thought about nuclear deterrence and approached the risks of nuclear war, encouraging restraint
and the pursuit of treaties like the Limited Test Ban Treaty.139 However, in the context of the
debate over an ABM, other accounts, such as that by Ernest Yanarella, emphasize the technical
factors involved, almost entirely excluding the influence of the Cuban Missile Crisis.140
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Ultimately, documentary evidence suggests the actors involved in the demise of Nike-Zeus
established their positions months before the crisis, but had their attitudes reinforced by their
experience that October, McNamara in particular.
In January during a meeting between the President and the Joint Chiefs, General Decker
expressed “the Army’s position as favoring the earliest possible go-ahead on Nike-Zeus
production.”141 While the Army wanted production and deployment, Carl Kaysen, the
President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security, reiterated concerns about the
system’s effectiveness. During discussions that January of a test ban treaty and the potential to
get helpful data through ABM testing, Kayson remarked “the new knowledge will show us
chiefly how much less good these systems are likely to be.”142 These opening positions of Army
support for production and skepticism in the administration over technical details showcase the
continuity from the debates the previous year, and some pre-crisis views of the actors.
Additional details about the attitudes of McNamara and others before that October can be
discerned from other documents. In particular, a July 29 memo by the Deputy Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs Ural Johnson to Rusk provides insight and outlines the course of the
debate over Zeus for the rest of the year.143 Johnson identified that new intelligence suggested
Soviet progress on their own ABM system had been “more rapid” “than we had previously
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anticipated.”144 Thus, there should be “a fresh look at our decisions on deployment of an antimissile system.”145 Johnson, in true Rusk State Department form, was worried about the
“powerful political and propaganda repercussions of who is first in deploying anti-missile
defenses” and advocated for rapid limited deployment of Zeus.146 Further, Johnson told Rusk
there was “controversy within the Pentagon over whether the degree of military utility of the
presently developed anti-missile systems, in particular the Nike Zeus, is sufficient to justify at
this time a decision on grounds of the military capabilities of that system. Secretary McNamara
has concluded that it is not.”147 The memo also identified Paul Nitze as supporting McNamara on
the issue, even in the face of new intelligence about Soviet developments, while the views of the
Joint Chiefs and General Taylor were “not known.”148 The clear positions of McNamara and
Nitze against the ABM, even to a Pentagon outsider like Johnson, suggests these were not
fleeting stances, and McNamara would ultimately reach a decision against deploying Zeus on the
grounds identified by Johnson. Moreover, the uncertain views of Taylor and the Chiefs comports
with their past and future record of indecision and disunity on the issue. Apart from the
clarification of the various positions of the Chiefs and Taylor, only the introduction of Nike-X
significantly changes the dynamic described to Rusk by Johnson here.
The experience of coming to the brink of Armageddon in October of 1962 had a dramatic
influence on how many policymakers in the Kennedy administration approached nuclear
weapons. Confident discussions about the virtues of a counterforce strategy to fight limited
nuclear wars was replaced with “an all-consuming fear of nuclear confrontation that
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characterized the Kennedy administration’s approach to nuclear weapons.”149 Many scholars
argue this extended to the pivot from the limited deployment recommendation of 1961 to the
final decision not to deploy Nike-Zeus. James Cameron, for example, argues “the major change
was [McNamara’s] shift towards a more studied ambiguity regarding Soviet strategy,
underpinned by a greater sense of the unintended consequences of nuclear confrontation.”150
However, this position is complicated by considering McNamara’s conclusion that a deployment
decision would be inappropriate based on its military utility and capability, as referenced in the
July 29 memo. That position, predating the Cuban Missile Crisis by about two and a half months,
points towards the enduring importance of technical evaluations in McNamara’s decisionmaking. This is not to say the experience of the crisis did not play a significant role in the
decision not to pursue Zeus or for future ABM debates, but rather to emphasize that technical
problems meant the system was likely already being sidelined.
Technological developments during 1961 and 1962 also provided more options and room
to maneuver for the administration in 1962 as well. Regarding production and deployment, one
report noted that “there are no options.”151 It elaborated that “if there is a decision to begin
production, “good old” Zeus has to be the product.”152 But there had been some improvements
made to “good old Zeus” which enabled flexibility beyond production or deployment.
McNamara outlined in his November 20 draft memorandum on ballistic missile defense to
Kennedy that a set of advances had been made in the field. They included using the Zeus
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discrimination radar as a high-volume but low-accuracy threat tracker, reducing the minimum
intercept altitude for Zeus to allow for additional time to discriminate decoys and make
decisions, as well as progress in the development of the Sprint interceptor and phased array
radars.153 The latter two were the most significant, as Sprint enabled rapid interception of reentry vehicles in the atmosphere and phased array radars allowed tracking and discrimination
against a larger volume of threats, and were ultimately fused into the basis of Nike-X. Sprint and
the rest of Nike-X will be discussed in more detail in the following section. McNamara discussed
other combinations of improvements, but identified that the Army wanted Zeus deployed as soon
as possible, and augmented with Nike-X components as they became available.154 This
“Improved/Augmented” system was dismissed since it would only have “marginal effectiveness”
in its early stages until the Nike-X components were integrated. Therefore, McNamara
recommended research and development for Nike-X and reducing Nike-Zeus funding “below the
currently approved level,” limiting it “to the study of re-entry phenomena and defense
techniques, including anti-satellite defense.” Focusing on the new interceptor and radar meant a
decision about deployment could be deferred until 1964.155
The continued disunity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the acceptance and enactment of
this position possible. They had still not joined forces to present a united front against
McNamara and others who challenged their proposals. The dispute is outlined in the draft
memorandum McNamara sent to Kennedy mentioned above. McNamara articulates that the
Secretary of the Army’s plan, to deploy 16 Zeus batteries to 12 cities, and later 10 Nike-X
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batteries to urban areas, has the support of not only the Chiefs of the Army and Navy, but
General Maxwell Taylor as well.156 Taylor had only recently begun his tenure as the Chairman of
the JCS in October of 1962, a position he would keep until July 1964. While Taylor had opposed
Zeus as the Special Military Assistant to the President the year before and had worked with
McNamara on defeating the Skybolt air launched ballistic missile earlier in his tenure as Chair,
he now supported the Army and Navy Chiefs.157 According to L.J. Legere in a memo to
McGeorge Bundy, Taylor “feels about as strongly on this subject as any matter that has come
within his purview since taking over the new job,” since it is “the most glaring deficiency in US
military posture” and there is “growing evidence of a substantial Soviet effort in the same
field.”158 The reasoning behind Taylor’s dramatic reversal on the ABM issue is not readily
available in the examined documents, but may have been a result of the environment at the JCS
or his desire to cooperate with the Army and Navy on the issue.
There were additional arguments made by the Chiefs of the Army and Navy beyond those
mentioned above. They included concerns about American prestige if the Soviets produced an
ABM first, worries that a minor power like Cuba could cause significant damage, the exposure to
“accidental, irrational, and unauthorized attacks,” as well as providing a defense earlier than
solely working on Nike-X.159 An additional point came from a superstar panel organized by the
Institute for Defense Analysis, which included Thomas Schelling and Hermann Khan, and
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argued an improved Zeus could be used to absorb “ragged retaliation” after an American first
strike.160 Many of these arguments were rebutted by the Air Force, who identified that
deployment “constitutes acceptance before any measure of the defense system effectiveness has
been established,” and that no forecasted system would provide the type of urban protection the
Army was talking about.161 Instead, the Chief of the Air Force largely aligned with McNamara
but was interested in getting additional testing for Nike-Zeus.162
The Air Force did not split with the Army and Navy purely out of spite. There were
genuine goals for them in this instance of interservice rivalry. A report that December from a
Strategic Concepts Committee within the Air Force concluded that “the Air Force should play a
central role in seeing that a sensible program of anti-missile defense gets underway.”163 The
report argued that by using Sprint and phased array radars, a terminal defense of ICBMs was
becoming possible.164 Having active defenses would allow the Air Force to take a mixed
approach to protecting their strategic forces, combining hardening silos, ABM, dispersal, and
mobility to increase their survivability.165 Of course, since these defenses would be protecting
Air Force assets, there would be a convincing case to be made for them to fall under Air Force,
rather than Army, jurisdiction. Additionally, since these active defenses would be protecting
missiles rather than cities, there was more acceptable room for error in the capability of the ABM
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system. However, the report still acknowledged that area defenses like an improved version of
Zeus would complement the more localized, hardpoint defenses, creating defense in depth.166
This report helps bring the Air Force’s position of supporting Nike-X and additional Zeus testing
into focus, as it aligns with its overarching goals for the ICBM force. Moreover, the concept of
area defenses complementing point defenses to create a more effective defense in depth became
the foundation for most of the ABM plans going forward.
A final point made by the Air Force in their dissension from the Army and Navy
concerned civil defenses. As mentioned above, civil defenses include fallout shelters and other
measures to protect civilians from the effects of nuclear weapons. Civil defenses were also
immensely unpopular. When the Kennedy administration discussed a civil defense initiative and
requested funding in the 1961 budget, it provoked significant public outcry and widespread
panic, and was severely curtailed by Congress.167 By the spring of 1962, the idea of “an
effective, practical and implicitly popular civil-defense program” had taken “a terrible and
sobering beating.”168 Typically tone-deaf, it was in this context that the Air Force proposed that
“a decision to deploy active ballistic missile defense should depend, in part, on the required
complementary civil defense program.”169
Tying together active and passive defenses was sound warfighting logic, and this was
neither the first nor last time they would be tethered. The Gaither Report had endorsed civil
defenses and other passive measures in the late 1950s. The connection had also made a brief
appearance in the 1961 debate. McNamara had remarked that “deployment of any active city
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defense (including Nike Zeus) presupposes a system of civilian fall-out shelters.”170 Nearly
identical words were used by Dean Rusk in his comments to McNamara on the budget.171 While
not playing a large role in this round, discussions about the civil defense connection then were
laying the groundwork for future controversies, when McNamara would shackle ABM to civil
defense, functionally the third rail of U.S. domestic nuclear politics, to try and stop missile
defense programs.
Dean Rusk made one last appeal to McNamara in favor of Nike-Zeus, hammering away
at the “psychology argument.”172 He warned about the declining “ability of the US to mobilize
public will, both within the US and among our Allies, to accept the risks inherent in living in a
world of such sharply competing ideologies.”173 Without a comparable system to the one the
Soviets were building, referencing construction around Leningrad, Rusk still thought it would
jeopardize the will to fight. This indicates Rusk thought nuclear superiority and having a
technical edge over the Soviets would enable effective brinksmanship, drawing on a particular
interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Pushing back against McNamara’s calculations, he
remarked “that to the people living under the threat of a massive nuclear missile attack, the fact
that it may be sounder economics to buy more offensive missiles than defensive ones, will be
vitiated if not entirely lost when it is recognized that only defensive missiles offer the possibility
of saving lives.”174 Rusk’s complaint was an emotive argument against McNamara’s emphasis
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on rationality. General Curtis LeMay, notorious former commander of SAC and now Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, echoed this critique in a less profound manner, and told the president that
“‘war is not efficient,’ and consequently, its needs and its plans couldn’t be run by computer
efficiency measurements.”175 Nevertheless, at the same meeting LeMay griped about
computations, Kennedy backed McNamara in killing Zeus and shifting focus to Nike-X.
As intercabinet and interagency disputes over Zeus intensified over the course of 1962,
many of those involved activated new bureaucratic strategies. McNamara used civil defenses and
the new technology of Nike-X to push back against the still relatively weak and fractured
supporters of Nike-Zeus. However, even though pivoting to support developing technology
removed the pressure for deployment in 1962, it ensured the question had to be revisited, and
that fighting over the issue would continue and aggravate. Crafting this brief consensus fueled
the tensions between the civilian and military personnel at the Department of Defense which
would characterize much of McNamara’s tenure as secretary. The Cuban Missile Crisis had
caused many decision-makers to reevaluate the utility of nuclear superiority, but not the public,
meaning external pressure could still build for an ABM. By the end of the year, there were
increasingly divergent positions on ABM within the government, even though technical issues
had sealed the fate of Nike-Zeus.
Nike’s X Factor
Nike-Zeus was a single concept system, a reflection of its roots as an iteration of an air
defense program. The singular nature of Zeus was demonstrated in the debates surrounding how
it would be deployed. They concentrated on the number of batteries, each of which had a set
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configuration of radars and launchers for interceptors. On the other hand, “Nike-X was not a
single ABM system concept. Rather, it should be thought of as a collective term to cover a
number of studies and exploratory developments aimed at leading from the then outmoded NikeZeus to the next generation of ABM system.”176 The developments in Nike-X were produced in
part as a reaction to conservatives estimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities throughout the 1970s,
designed to address penetration aides including chaff, decoys, and electronic countermeasures.177
These advances included a set of new phased-array radars, the innovative Sprint interceptor, and
the iterative Spartan interceptor.
One of the most critical breakthroughs under Nike-X was in harnessing advancements in
solid state computing for creating electronically steered phased-array radars.178 The significance
of phased-array radars was mentioned briefly earlier but was emphasized by Secretary
McNamara in 1966. He noted that “instead of scanning the skies with an electronic beam by
mechanically rotating the entire radar structure, the structure is covered with thousands of
sensors and is kept stationary while the electronic beam does the rotating.”179 This electronic
steering allows the beam to rotate “a million times faster than a mechanical structure,”
significantly enhancing tracking and search abilities.180 There were three different phased-array
radars developed for Nike-X which will be discussed here, MAR, MSR, and PAR, which
reflected the shifting objectives assigned to the ABM over time.
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The first was the Multifunction Array Radar, or MAR. MAR could perform all the
defense functions for dealing with a large, sophisticated attack including battle management and
control, long range search and acquisition, discrimination, and control of interceptors.181 MAR’s
ability to perform all necessary functions to defend against a large attack using penetration aids
and other tactics meant it was the centerpiece of city defense plans.182 Similar to the MAR was
the Missile Site Radar, or MSR. It was cheaper and had worse coverage than MAR, but could
also perform search, track, designation, and interceptor track and guidance functions. While
designed to complement a MAR, the MSR could also serve “as a cost-effective duplication, on a
lesser scale, of the MAR.”183 An MSR operating independently of an MAR was conceived of to
defend smaller cities or targets, as the Nixon administration deemphasized urban defense in its
ABM planning. Additionally, an MSR was part of the final product of the ABM debate, the
Mickelson Safeguard Complex near Grand Forks, North Dakota. The third type of phased-array
radar produced under the aegis of Nike-X was the Perimeter Acquisition Radar, or PAR. As
discussion moved towards area defense as a part of the eventual ABM system, and shifted away
from urban or city defense, the need for a sensor which “could detect, track, and designate
targets above the atmosphere at very long ranges” emerged.184 PAR fulfilled that role, and
several PARs were also connected to the Mickelson Complex to complement the MSR in using
the Spartan interceptors effectively.
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The Sprint missile was quite remarkable and distinct from previous attempts at an ABM
interceptor. Sprint was a two-stage solid propellant missile for short range intercepts inside the
atmosphere.185 This endo-atmospheric intercept was critical to Sprint’s mission and solving the
problem of decoys. Decoy re-entry vehicles were designed to be very light, with a quintessential
example being a mylar balloon shaped like a conical re-entry vehicle. Ballistic missiles have a
certain quantity of “throw weight,” a maximum weight they can deliver to the target. Decoys and
other penetration aids trade off with more or heavier warheads as they consume some of the
throw weight. In space, the weight of the decoy does not matter since it is moving at the same
speed as the re-entry vehicle after being deployed from the final stage of the missile. However,
once the decoy and re-entry vehicle hit the atmosphere, the decoy slows down much faster since
it has less weight and thus less inertia. Therefore, decoys could be distinguished from real
warheads through atmospheric filtering since they move more rapidly through the atmosphere.
The problem with atmospheric filtering is, by this point, the re-entry vehicle is moving
astonishingly fast, and there is not much time before it hits its target. The solution was to make
Sprint also astonishingly fast. After being ejected from its silo using a gas-powered piston, “a
typical intercept would occur at an altitude of 40,000 feet, at a ground range of 10 nautical miles,
after about 10 seconds of flight time.”186 As it accelerated towards its top speed of over Mach 10,
or 7,672 miles per hour, the body of the interceptor would become visibly shining and
incandescent from the heat.187 During this very fast and very brief flight period, Sprint was
guided by radio command from one of the control radars discussed above.188
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The Spartan missile, unlike Sprint, was iterative. It built upon the Nike-Zeus interceptor,
with some differences. It was a “three-stage, solid-propellant missile” which could “intercept
ballistic missiles at extremely high altitude and long range.”189 Also distinct from Sprint, Spartan
intercepted its targets outside the atmosphere. Exo-atmospheric interception had issues since it
faced the decoy and chaff problem but had advantages in terms of the amount of the area it could
defend. Attacking the re-entry vehicle in space before the terminal phase began allowed Spartan
to defend a vastly larger area. The real innovation with the Spartan interceptor and the area
defense component of the ABM system was its warhead, which will be discussed later.
There were improvements to the Spartan interceptor’s ability to deal with advanced
penetration aids during debates over the character of ABM, resulting in what was called
Improved Spartan.190 The main upgrade in Improved Spartan was the ability to have the
interceptor loiter. Amusingly, the best description of loitering is provided by the CIA when
discussing the potential for the Soviet ABM to have a loiter capability. The CIA states that
loitering is “a mode in which the interceptor is launched toward the general vicinity of the
incoming objects, flies at reduced thrust until the target can be identified as it enters the
atmosphere, and is then directed to the target at accelerated thrust. The loiter thus utilizes
atmospheric sorting of RVs but does not require a very high acceleration interceptor missile.”191
Loiter-mode provided the capability to get the area defense interceptor close enough, and then
wait for better information from atmospheric filtering before attacking the target, maybe using a
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different intercept geometry, and attacking from a higher point in space. It is not clear whether
Improved Spartan with its loitering capability was the version ultimately deployed near Grand
Forks, but the upgrades were much discussed, and loiter-mode is quite fascinating.
The developments under Nike-X resulted in a selection of component pieces which
needed to be put together into a coherent system. Fierce arguments were had over the correct
composition of those pieces or whether it should be constructed in the first place. This was the
problem which faced the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Describing a set of goals to be
achieved by an anti-ballistic missile system and compiling the components to achieve those goals
proved extraordinarily contentious. The bitter debates it provoked led to revisions of those goals
and compositions, which influenced the technology, as evidenced by the various radars discussed
above. These controversies resulted in a series of circumscriptions and caveats which made the
technology less effective as political deliberation and maneuverings divorced it from the mission
it was designed for. This process began almost immediately after Nike-X was chosen over Zeus,
and the initial phases of these contortions played out during the Johnson presidency.
The Interregnum: 1963-1965
After the decision to pursue Nike-X over Nike-Zeus in 1962 in the aftermath of the
October crisis, the issue lay somewhat dormant for a number of years. The new technology
incorporated into Nike-X required time to mature, and until then, there was little else anyone
could do. Many actors used this period to reassess or reconfigure their positions on ABM,
including the Joint Chiefs and McNamara. There was also a new president, Lyndon Baines
Johnson, who had different priorities than Kennedy. Johnson wanted to pursue an aggressive and
sweeping set of domestic policy goals, the Great Society, but he needed to maintain confidence
in the militarized containment of the Soviet Union to do so, including going to war in
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Vietnam.192 Moreover, he saw spending on defense, particularly nuclear weapons, as cutting into
the funds available for social spending programs like Medicare and Social Security, and enjoined
McNamara to help him accomplish this.193 Together, Johnson and McNamara attempted to limit
attempts at missile defense as a part of this project. As Cameron notes, their “framework,
imposing strong cost-effectiveness constraints on missile defense, was designed to keep ABM in
research and development almost indefinitely in a way that would satisfy both the need for
strategic strength and budgetary prudence.”194 This task was made difficult as the administration
escalated its involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s. It became increasingly difficult to pay for
the war and the Great Society, and social backlash to the conflict became prevalent, pushing
Johnson and later Nixon towards détente. Johnson and McNamara’s approach was successful for
a time, until a combination of factors militated against deferring the ABM issue.
The Soviets were not helpful to McNamara and Johnson in their endeavor. They had two
different projects which could potentially serve a missile defense role which McNamara had to
discuss in his recommendations for force planning for FY 1966-1970. One of the Soviet
programs was near Moscow and more confidently assessed as the beginnings of a missile
defense system.195 The second was a string of installations near Leningrad which became known
as the Tallinn Line and were the subject of a fierce debate within the intelligence community.196
Nevertheless, McNamara concluded in 1964 that though there was “considerable uncertainty”
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regarding these programs, “even if they were to deploy ABM defenses, our penetration aids and
multiple warheads should keep the “entry price” of missile attacks against defended targets
within tolerable limits.”197 By the following year, National Intelligence Estimates concluded the
Soviets could likely achieve an initial operational capability for the Moscow system in 1967 or
1968, and would expand their defenses beyond the capitol.198 As the Soviets progressed with the
Tallinn Line and Moscow systems over this period, pressure began to increase on the
administration from many quarters, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
One of the most significant developments of the period from 1963 to 1965 happened at
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After several years of having their programs slashed and being played
off against each other, they finally found common cause in opposing McNamara. One of the
issues they chose to organize around was missile defense, ultimately appealing directly to
Congress in 1966. The beginnings of this unity can be seen in 1964, however. While Taylor, still
Chair of the JCS, notes that the Chiefs did not reach a consensus on Nike-X, the contention was
over a question of the optimum balance between offenses and defenses as well as how much
longer Nike-X needed to remain in development, rather than the necessity and eventual
deployment of the system.199 Taylor thought having defenses would help limit damage to the
U.S. in the event of nuclear conflict, and therefore some components should go into pre-
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production and 200 interceptors, enough to defend one area, should be produced as a
prototype.200 This conclusion was echoed by General Earle G. Wheeler, who took over as Chair
of the JCS in July of 1964 after a stint as Secretary of the Army.201 However, since there were
still questions concerning the ideal composition between offensive and defensive nuclear forces
and no clear preferred concept of deployment, McNamara was able to fend off calls for
production to begin in FY 1966.202
The following year, however, the Chiefs began presenting a united front in favor of ABM
and Nike-X. By November, they were unanimous in their belief that “the requirement for an
effective ballistic missile defense is a very real and urgent one” and thus production and “phased
deployment” should begin at the “earliest practicable date.”203 They articulated that “our
strategic defense posture” “could be placed in jeopardy by delay in the IOC of the Nike-X
system,” constituting “a military risk that should not be accepted.”204 The conformity of opinion
was enabled by a proposal from the Army and Bell Telephone Laboratories that October which
finalized a deployment concept they could support. The Chiefs had a few complaints about the
overly limited nature of the Army-BTL proposal, but were mollified by its design, which would
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“permit controlled growth” as well as “providing the necessary decision latitude required for a
program of this magnitude.”205
The Army-BTL proposal was outlined in a review conducted by the President’s Science
Advisory Committee. It consisted of a “high-altitude, area defense of the entire country and a
limited deployment of terminal Nike-X defense for high-value targets.”206 This two-layered
system created defense in depth, which the Air Force had discussed in 1962, theoretically
enhancing its effectiveness and meaning the proposed system could fulfill many roles. The basic
architecture of the Army-BTL proposal, an area defense component coupled with a terminal
Nike-X defense for select sites, proved a surprisingly resilient concept, and would form the basis
for most ABM proposals going forwards. The justification and argumentation in favor of that
architecture, however, was incredibly fluid and malleable.
The Army-BTL proposal was “intended to ensure that the United States will be
essentially invulnerable to Chinese nuclear attack for a considerable period of time.”207
Considering that the People’s Republic of China had detonated its first nuclear device the
previous year, and the concerns about the “rationality” or aggressiveness of the PRC, there were
genuine fears about Chinese nuclear attacks in Washington. The rationale of secondary powers
or accidental attacks had been part of the discussion since the Eisenhower administration and had
even been alluded to in McNamara’s memo on strategic force recommendations the year

205

Ibid.
United States President's Science Advisory Committee, Strategic Military Panel, “Report on the Proposed ArmyBTL Ballistic Missile Defense System,” Top Secret, Report, October 29, 1965, DNSA, Doc ID: 1679150636.
https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/report-on-proposed-army-btl-ballisticmissile/docview/1679150636/se-2?accountid=7103 (accessed November 7, 2021).
207
Ibid.
206

61

before.208 McNamara had noted that “a small, balanced defense program involving a moderate
civil defense effort and a very limited deployment of a low cost configuration of the NIKE X
system (which is technically feasible without commitment to a full-scale deployment) could,
indeed, significantly reduce fatalities” from an attack by a smaller nuclear armed power.209 The
connection McNamara made in this, and previous memos, between ABM and civil defenses was
also made by PSAC, who noted that if the system were expanded, as it was designed to be, “a
substantial expansion of our civil defense program would surely have to be considered.”210
However, the PSAC report noted some significant problems with using China as a justification
for the ABM system, criticisms which would become staples of the debate for the next few years.
The first of these problems was the timeframe. When the program was proposed,
intelligence estimates placed the initial operational capability of a Chinese ICBM at somewhere
between 1970-1975 at the earliest.211 Even if this prediction proved true, it would just be a
handful of missiles and launchers, not a fully-fledged arsenal. Additionally, there was little
justification for having an absolute defense against this threat instead of deterring it using the
vastly superior U.S. arsenal, similar to the situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Moreover,
focusing on a hypothetical ICBM threat from the PRC neglected the capabilities they did possess
or were closer to achieving. The Chinese had acquired a Golf-class missile submarine, cruise
missiles, and potentially medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) from the Soviets.212 The
Army-BTL system would not add to defense against the air-breathing cruise missiles and was
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poorly configured to deal with a submarine-launched version of the MRBM. If the MRBM was
launched against targets in the continental United States, the distance would be too short for the
missile to be intercepted by the area defense component, requiring the terminal Nike-X
component to destroy it.213 Obviating the area defense component, and the proliferation of
terminal Nike-X sites required to achieve the goal of defending the entire country, would have
undercut the limited and low-cost criteria of such a defense. PSAC suggested a reasonable and
significantly cheaper response to the submarine launched missile threat from China would be
enhanced anti-submarine warfare efforts and capabilities.
PSAC further recognized that even if there were earnest concerns about Chinese missiles,
this justification for an ABM would not fool anyone. The national origin of the target missile is
of no concern to the interceptor, and the report acknowledged that “no matter how much we
advertise the fact that the defense is directed at the Chinese, the Soviet Union and the rest of the
world will probably consider that the principal significance of the system relates to its impact on
the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear confrontation.”214 This was particularly true of the growth
potential built into the program, which made it seem inevitable that the program would evolve
over time to address the Soviet threat. It further noted that it seemed unlikely the Soviets would
not take measures to ensure their arsenal could penetrate the defenses, either by incorporating
penetration aids in their existing missiles, or simply pursuing a larger arsenal.215
The phenomenon described above in which developments on one side of the arms race
provoked a response on the other side came to be known as “action/reaction.” This is one of the
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main characteristics of arms races as a function of the security dilemma, as described by many
political scientists.216 The action/reaction cycle had become more prominent in the mind of
McNamara and others after the Cuban Missile Crisis. He had warned about Soviet investments in
penetration aids, large yield warheads, and larger numbers of warheads in his recommendations
for the FY 1964 budget written one month after the crisis.217 These concerns were reinforced by
a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) drawn up by the CIA. The SNIE remarked that
the Soviets would see the announcement of any ABM system, regardless of size or orientation,
as a move to make their arsenal useless and a step towards a policy of nuclear warfighting.218 It
went on to outline a number of responses in addition to those mentioned by McNamara,
including more strategic bombers and cruise missiles, more SLBMs, additional effort on their
ABM, as well as space weapons.219
The space weapons response option merits some additional examination, as the version
the Soviets developed has become a classic in the genre of options to defeat an anti-ballistic
missile defense. In 1963, the CIA had warned the Soviets had the capability to place nuclear
weapons in orbit.220 While noting the Soviets did not appear to intend to do so, the report further
noted the Soviets would likely “consider them as one way of introducing additional
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complications into US defense planning.”221 What became known as a Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System (FOBS) would use an ICBM booster to place a nuclear warhead into low
earth orbit, and then fire retro rockets to cause the warhead to de-orbit and re-enter the
atmosphere.222 The word “fractional” in the name indicates that the weapon does not complete a
full orbit, only a fraction of one, as completing a full orbit would violate the Outer Space
Treaty’s provisions on emplacing nuclear weapons in space, depending on how the treaty was
interpreted. This had the advantage of being less predictable than a ballistic trajectory since the
time of re-entry was unpredictable. Moreover, FOBS could be sent over the south pole, rather
than the north pole, avoiding the majority of U.S. early warning and ABM radars, making it
perfect for attacking an ABM system.223 However, if sent over the north pole on a similar path to
a ballistic missile, it could actually reach its target faster than an ICBM.224 As American efforts
on ABM advanced, so too did Soviet work on their FOBS, succinctly demonstrating the
action/reaction phenomenon in real time.
In December of 1965, McNamara held a meeting about the FY 1967 budget, where three
different deployment options for Nike-X were considered. A light defense of the deterrent, a
light defense against China, and a heavy defense against the Soviet Union.225 By the end of 1965
multiple problems had emerged for McNamara and Johnson’s position on ABM, and the meeting
demonstrates McNamara was cognizant of this. The Soviets appeared to be progressing, if
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fitfully, with their system, which aggravated the domestic politics of the arms race. The Chiefs
were becoming more vocal about the issue and increased their coordination within the
interagency, intercabinet competition. A more specific plan and justification had emerged for an
ABM program, which enhanced the bureaucratic position of those in favor of an ABM. Dean
Rusk assured McNamara there were no foreign policy problems which would impede or
outweigh the ABM.226 Congress, while amenable to capping the defense budget earlier in the
1960s, had defense committees in both houses dominated by hawkish Southern Democrats.227
The end of this period of relative calm for ABM discussions demonstrates the importance of both
the domestic perception of the arms race, and the bureaucratic actors involved, to the decisionmaking process. The confluence of these factors in 1966 and 1967 ultimately forced the Johnson
administration’s hand on ABM and undermined the framework Johnson and McNamara had
used to delay it.
Pressure Rises, Bets are Hedged: 1966
While ABM and Nike-X laid low for much of 1966, by that December McNamara was
outlining to Johnson six reasons why the issue had finally come to a head for the administration.
These included the accelerated deployment of hardened Soviet ICBMs, Soviet ABM
deployments, Chinese missile tests, Nike-X’s progress, the Chiefs, and Congress.228 McNamara
was able to secure the deferral of ABM for another year, but he saw the writing on the wall and
was forced into some uncomfortable positions to do so. Afraid of the repercussions of a system
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designed to defend against Soviet countervalue strikes, McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Cyrus Vance, and others, worked to lay the groundwork for a more limited system while also
attempting to engage the Soviets in negotiations over an ABM freeze.
The largest and most problematic factor for those opposed to the ABM was Soviet
activity. The Tallinn Line was again the subject of controversy. In their National Intelligence
Estimate on Soviet strategic air and missile defenses for that year, the CIA concluded that while
there may be some latent capability in the line to intercept ballistic missiles, its mission was to
defend against aircraft or cruise missiles.229 This conclusion was contested by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and many others at the Pentagon who saw it as “more likely” to have an
ABM role as well.230 While this may have been their genuine belief, the motivations for a more
hawkish assessment of Tallinn were clear, as it would bolster the premise that the U.S. was
falling behind on ABM and justify a new program.
Even if Tallinn had no ABM capability, the Moscow system, which also came to be
known as Galosh, was coming online. While the CIA was unsure whether Galosh, a new system,
or no system would be used to protect the entirety of the Soviet Union, they were confident that
the initial operational capability of the system would be in the next year or so, and it would be
fully operational around 1970.231 Moreover, the CIA postulated that the full scope of the program
would reflect what actions the U.S. took in its strategic force planning, tacitly endorsing
McNamara’s action/reaction understanding. Yet, the NIE noted that there were profound
limitations to the Moscow system. There were significant radar gaps, meaning Polaris missiles
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launched from submarines in parts of the Mediterranean and Indian oceans would not be
spotted.232 It was further assessed that the system could be easily saturated and would be
susceptible to penetration aids and blackout attacks.233 The U.S. had already developed the
Polaris A-3, a missile with three re-entry vehicles which were designed to help saturate an ABM
even though they were not independently targetable.234 This multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV)
technology was distinct from the much more complex multiple independently-targetable re-entry
vehicle (MIRV) technology. The former is more akin to the scattering of a shotgun shell,
whereas each warhead in the latter could theoretically be accurately guided to a distinct target.
The impact of Galosh was discussed during a pivotal meeting at Johnson’s ranch on
December 6th, in which General McConnell said it had “imposed heavy additional costs” on the
U.S. strategic forces to “assure our continued penetration ability.”235 McNamara’s response to
this assertion was that the U.S. had overcompensated in targeting Galosh, concluding “the Soviet
ABM’s have not saved Soviet lives.”236 This was borne out by declassified targeting documents,
which indicated that the Moscow system, Tallinn Line, and its accompanying radars would have
been targeted by about 130 warheads, with 70 dedicated to the Moscow installations.237 This
would have included over 100 Minuteman ICBMs, or about 10% of the total ICBM force.238 The
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U.S. targeting response to Galosh thoroughly demonstrated the futility of ABM in the face of a
determined and well equipped adversary.
Despite the American overreaction to Soviet ABM developments, the intelligence was
not public. It was a conversation happening internally within the administration and the military.
But there were concerns about the Russian advancements leaking to the press, Congress, and the
public. Yet, the administration could only keep this under wraps for so long, and on November
10th, McNamara announced that Soviet ABM deployment was under way, with some additional
general details about Galosh.239 A State Department report noted that “as more information on
the Soviet progress in ABM leaks out, pressures in Congress for a US ABM deployment will
grow.”240 McNamara expounded on this, commenting that even though “more mature reflection
on all of the factors involved in this vastly complex problem should convince at least the
majority of the informed public,” it would require “a massive program” to “present all of the
relevant information, and in an understandable form, to both the Congress and the general
public.”241 These concerns were echoed by Cyrus Vance. He argued “the first reaction of most
Americans will inevitably be in favor of an immediate start on deployment, if for no other reason
than the Soviets are deploying an ABM system.”242 It is easy to see the allure of these arguments,
as it is hard to argue against a system that saves lives, and that the other side has.
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The emphasis on saving lives in the event of nuclear conflict was a large part of the
arguments deployed by the Joint Chiefs in 1966 in favor of a system to defend against Soviet
attacks. The JCS was advocating for the beginning of a 25-city defense that year. They said that
the Soviet ABM and increasingly numerous hardened Soviet missile sites were complicating
targeting for the U.S., and therefore an ABM was needed to maintain U.S. superiority and
prevent an imbalance from emerging.243 Even though the complication was resolved by throwing
warheads at it, the Chiefs reiterated the need for superiority. This point was sometimes
articulated with remarkable racist panache, such as when “General McConnell said he can’t
forget that we are dealing with the descendants of Genghis Khan. They only understand
force.”244 This was complemented by the usual argumentative suspects, such as accidental
launch, defending against China, protecting the population, and hedging against nuclear
blackmail.245
During the meeting at Johnson’s ranch in Texas, the president asked what the real
difference between the Chiefs and McNamara was. McNamara articulated that “the difference
lay less in rational calculation than in the inherently emotional nature of the issue. It was
extremely hard to make the case for a policy which appeared to be denying protection to our
people, when the Soviet Union was willing to employ large resources to protect its people.”246
The argument against it centered on the action/reaction cycle and relied on sound, yet
counterintuitive logic. He warned that “we would be launching ourselves and the Soviet Union
into two decades of escalatory action in the nuclear field” but “we would each end up no better
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off than we are at present.”247 Vance noted the Soviets would not be the only ones to expand,
since Congress would likely try to dramatically expand the 25 city program the JCS were
advocating for, anticipating other regions and cities clamoring for protection.248 While
uncertainty about the effectiveness of the technology was still a big issue, McNamara recognized
that it was becoming a less and less compelling argument, especially in the context of Soviet
deployments.
Interestingly, the Chiefs either did not understand the logic of action/reaction, or they
were ignoring it. General Johnson stated that “an ABM system would cut our casualties in a
nuclear exchange,” ignoring McNamara’s point about the Soviets re-establishing their ability to
penetrate it.249 An interesting note, however, pertains to the state of Soviet work on defeating
ABM at this point. A study from the Defense Science Board Task Force on Ballistic Missile
Defense that September had noted the Soviet had not done very much work on penetration aids,
and it would take a while for them to defeat an ABM, further extending U.S. supremacy for a
period.250 While this argument did not account for saturation attacks or more innovative
approaches like FOBS, it is interesting to note the lag in Soviet work in this field.
To minimize the damage in the event of an ABM being deployed and Johnson
succumbing to pressure from the Chiefs, Congress, and others, McNamara activated two
strategies. Firstly, he laid the groundwork for a system to defend against China. The more limited
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nature of the threat would allow the defense to be more limited as well. He emphasized in
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that what was then known as the “Nth
country threat” “has become more real and the feasibility of a moderately priced defense against
it more promising” in the past year.251 However, he noted that a threat to the continental U.S.
from China had yet to emerge, and that the deployment of an ABM in response to it should be
linked to the pace at which that threat evolved.252 McNamara used this type of caveat, where
certain measures by adversaries could justify ABM deployment by the U.S., to try to create
litmus tests for whether deployment should happen. One he set up in the Soviet context was “if
early Soviet MIRV threat emerges,” which would be very surprising even in the context of the
most extreme Soviet threat assessments.253 Nevertheless, McNamara was trying to create the
conditions where if an ABM had to happen, it would be a more limited kind, less likely to
provoke a significant new chapter in the arms race.
The second strategy McNamara proposed was negotiation. He thought that if there could
be an agreement about ABM between the U.S. and the Soviets, it would remove much of the
pressure to deploy. This was raised at the much-discussed meeting at LBJ’s ranch, where
Johnson “wondered if the best opportunity for agreement among us would not be a decision to
move ahead on a limited basis and to see what we can negotiate with the Soviet Union.”254 This
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was quickly acted upon, as two days later, December 8th, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E.
Thompson mentioned to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that his “guess is that the Soviets will take
us up on this,” and was rather bullish on the prospect of negotiations. Talking to the Soviets and
discussing defending against China were therefore the two prongs of the strategy McNamara
activated to attempt to limit the repercussions or damage from a decision to deploy if he lost that
battle entirely. These precautions underscore McNamara’s aptitude for bureaucratic wrangling,
and his deep concern about the trajectory of the arms race should an anti-Soviet ABM be
pursued.
These measures, however, did not endear McNamara with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now
that they were largely in agreement on ABM, the Chiefs were consistently pressing for a
deployment or production decision. Multiple memos near the end of the year from General
Wheeler, the Chair of the JCS, hammered the message that they were no longer in support of
postponement home to McNamara.255 It became clear that McNamara and Vance were at odds
with the JCS on this issue, with a memo from Vance to Johnson even identifying it as one of the
five “major issues between” the parties.256 It was compounded by the Chiefs frustration with
McNamara over the conduct of the Vietnam war, particularly the aerial bombardment
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campaign.257 McNamara’s consistent rejection of their recommendations on this issue ultimately
precipitated their direct appeal to Congress, exacerbating the pressures for an ABM.
Congress, and especially the Senate, would become the focal point for the ABM
controversy over the next few years. In addition to being worried about their reaction to the news
of the Soviet ABM, the administration was keeping tabs on the general sentiment on the issue in
the legislative branch. Cyrus Vance noted to Johnson how even though “Congress is divided”
they still “believe that a substantial majority favor going ahead with some form of
deployment.”258 It was emphasized the support was “led by Senator Russell and has strong
backing in the Armed Services Committees of both Houses.”259 Indeed, earlier that year,
McNamara had fought off the tandem efforts of both Armed Services Committees and the JCS to
secure preproduction of components by emphasizing Congress’ resistance to funding civil
defense funding, an issue so toxic that “even pro-ABM figures such as Jackson were not willing
to go to the mat.”260 This impression was reinforced by McNamara at the pivotal ranch meeting
in December, who said a liberal 25% would oppose it, while another 40% would back Russell,
Jackson, Strom Thurmond, and the other supporters, leaving about 35% to be persuaded.261
However, he elaborated that Congress had been interested in the issue for a while, and had
“voted $165 million for ABM’s” without a plan beyond that “they merely wanted to move in that
direction.”262 This was therefore a political issue ripe for controversy, especially with an election
in the offing.
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Rumblings of an “ABM Gap” were building among Republicans who were gearing up
for an election in 1968. The Republican National Committee published two pamphlets on the
ABM question during 1967, attacking Johnson’s position.263 There was frustration with not only
the continued progress of the Soviet ABM and lack of a comparative U.S. program, but with
concerns about executive authority in this area as well. Johnson had not been spending money
Congress had appropriated for production and deployment of ABM, an act of executive
noncompliance.264 This became “a major symbol of misplaced power” impinging on the
Congressional prerogative of appropriation, which spurred frustration in Congress.265 This
dissatisfaction presaged the fight in Congress the following year which was the first real
pushback the executive experienced on nuclear weapons issues and reflected the growing
antipathy towards the Pentagon.266 This situation laid out clear domestic political stakes for the
Democrats and the Johnson administration. Consolidation between the Southern and hawkish
Democrats as well as Republicans over needing to be tough on Communism and confident in the
arms race, JCS frustration with McNamara, and the now public Soviet ABM forced the
administration to make a decision early the following year.
By 1966, the ABM advocates had become stronger in the interagency and intercabinet
debates than in the Eisenhower and early Kennedy administrations. Coordination among the
Joint Chiefs was a significant factor, but the domestic politics of the arms race flaring up over
Galosh deployments was crucial. Even though the actual effective countermeasure to the Soviet
ABM had been taken, penetration aids, MRVs, and saturation, the domestic political
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interpretation was that the United States also needed an ABM. In response to the increasing
strength of those forces, McNamara pursued a multifaceted bureaucratic strategy to try and
salvage, or at least mitigate the damage to, the project he and Johnson were pursuing, adding
caveats and conditions to circumscribe any ABM. These maneuverings highlight the interaction
of the interagency debates and the domestic politics of the arms race, while demonstrating how
these deliberations could become convoluted as various actors and agendas competed.
All Roads Lead to San Francisco: 1967
January was a busy and decisive month for ABM in the Johnson administration. It began
on the 4th with a meeting in which McNamara outlined three options available to the president:
do nothing, a thin system, or a heavy system. Johnson succinctly surmised the conversation,
stating “the Chiefs wish to go all the way; the scientists say No; but if we go we should go with a
thin system because it might help our negotiations with the Soviet Union.”267 The Chiefs heavy,
Soviet oriented system would provide the most military protection, but would also be very
expensive at around $40 billion, and would exacerbate the action/reaction dynamic of the arms
race. Doing nothing was increasingly seen as politically infeasible. The light system would
provide a defense against China, accidents, protect some Minuteman fields, and of course have a
latent capability against the Soviets. This was couched as the option to thread the needle, resolve
the political problem of ABM without unduly upsetting the arms race.
The perspective of the light ABM being a safe middle ground was prophetically
dismembered earlier that day by Spurgeon Keeny, a staffer on the National Security Council, in a
memo to Donald Hornig, the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Keeny
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argued the thin system would “satisfy no one.”268 Liberals would attack it as an “unnecessary and
dangerous expense further undercutting the prospects of the Great Society” while conservatives
would pillory it as “inadequate and as a devious device to avoid coming to grips with the real
problem of providing real protection for the U.S. population against a Soviet attack” and most
people, who do not really care, “will be presented with a spectacle of a major Administration
decision which is attacked on all sides.”269 Keeny further worried it would be impossible to keep
the system from being expanded by justifications by the military and industry, especially since it
would be incredibly difficult to explain why some parts of the county were defended and others
were not.270 Keeny’s assessment of the domestic political fallout of the decision was remarkably
accurate. He accurately outlined the political fault lines of the issue and provided a warning of
the Congressional battles to come in the Nixon administration, where liberal Democrats would
no longer feel obligated to support the plans of their party’s president.
The concern for the political consequences is readily apparent in a phone call between
McNamara and Johnson the evening of the 4th. When asked his honest opinion on the situation,
McNamara replied “I still favor doing nothing as we initially recommended” but recognized “it
would be a helluva political crisis if you did nothing. The forces pushing you to do something are
very, very strong indeed.”271 The Secretary concluded “if we’re to go ahead, then I think the best
thing to do is the ‘thin’ system.”272 He worried, though, that if he testified against the heavy
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system the JCS preferred, Congress would “absolutely crucify him and through me you.”273 In
discussing strategies for advocating for a limited system, Johnson suggested pursuing an
agreement with the Soviets, and having funding for a thin system set up as a “contingency” if
negotiations failed. McNamara responded enthusiastically, “Oh, oh, yes, oh, yes, yes, yes, there’s
a real possibility of that, Mr. President,” and mentioned the Soviet openness to talks recently
relayed from the State Department.274 The coupling of negotiations and a “contingency” system
was adopted as the administration’s position moving forward on the issue in Johnson’s State of
the Union address a few days later on January 10th and other public statements shortly
thereafter.275
Johnson had begun activating the plans McNamara had laid down in case he lost the
battle over whether to deploy Nike-X. Johnson had been increasingly involved in the ABM issue
since the winter of 1966, even though he was not particularly interested in the controversy or saw
significant national security stakes in the outcome.276 However, Johnson was an adroit political
actor, and saw the ABM’s importance in the context of domestic politics. The Vietnam War was
costing him the support of many liberal Democrats, and negotiations with the Soviets over ABM
might help him shed public perception that he was a warmonger, casting him instead as a
peacemaker.277 The second half of the plan, committing to deploy an ABM if the talks failed,
would shore up his right flank, defanging critiques about an “ABM Gap” alluded to in
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Republican National Committee booklets which would emerge that February.278 Therefore,
Johnson used the State of the Union and the plan he and McNamara had created to solidify his
domestic position as much as possible.
While the administration announced it would request funds for an ABM, the scope and
character of that ABM had not been determined. Pending negotiations with the Soviets, the
question had changed from whether to deploy an ABM, to what ABM should be deployed. This
battle would rage through the Summer of 1967, definitively ended by McNamara’s speech in San
Francisco in September. This period saw McNamara activate his second prepared strategy, the
limited defense against China. One of the first notable events in this contest was a large meeting
on January 23rd. It gathered Johnson, the Joint Chiefs, and all the current and former Presidential
Science Advisors and Directors of Defense Research and Engineering to get their assessment of
the ABM issue.279 Johnson asked the assembled advisors whether the system would work, and
whether a heavy or thick defense against the Soviet Union should be pursued. The answer to
both questions was unanimous and negative.280 Not one of the advisors thought a heavy antiSoviet system should be deployed. The uniformity of this conclusion was used by McNamara in
his efforts to prevent the heavy or thick ABM, designed to defend against attacks from the Soviet
Union.
The Joint Chiefs were still very interested in deploying Nike-X in what was known as
“Posture A.” It was the proposal to have an area defense of the continental U.S. using Spartan
and a terminal defense of 25 cities using Sprint components. This posture was advocated by the
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Chair of the JCS, General Wheeler, before the House Armed Services Committee in early
March.281 Wheeler argued it would not only save lives, since “one nation will probably survive
best in a nuclear exchange,” but it would also make it more difficult to deter the Soviets if they
could limit damage from U.S. strikes with their ABM and the U.S. lacked any similar capability.
Moreover, the Chiefs “reaffirm their recommendation that a decision be made now to initiate
deployment of Nike-X for an initial operational capability in FY 1972.”282 They thought
deployment during negotiations would increase the pressure on the Soviets to agree to a freeze,
while reiterating their skepticism of U.S. ABM decisions influencing Soviet offensive missile
procurement.283 This was contested by McNamara and the other civilians in leadership positions
at the Pentagon in their testimony to Congress. They reiterated the significance of action/reaction
in favor of a more limited ABM system, while emphasizing that a defense against the Soviets
would require expanded civil and air defenses.284
The challenge articulated by the Chiefs to McNamara’s logic of action/reaction reflected
their different understandings of deterrence by this point. Early in the Kennedy administration
when discussions of counterforce strategies and damage limitation were popular, the military had
recognized the utility of these ideas to get the forces and programs they wanted. Counterforce
expanded the list of targets and leaned towards preemptive strikes while damage limitation
suggested the importance of defenses. As the attitudes of the civilians in control of the Pentagon
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started to shift, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the military maintained their adherence
to damage limitation and counterforce as an understanding of deterrence. This perspective sought
to minmax capabilities and forces to keep damage during a general nuclear war to a minimum
and held that those capabilities would increase the credibility of deterrent threats and leverage in
crises.285 McNamara and others who had been deeply involved in the crisis came to a different
understanding of deterrence which became known as assured destruction. Later pilloried by
opponents as “MAD,” assured destruction rested on the assumption that if the force could ride
out a Soviet first strike and retaliate, generating a certain amount of damage, it was credible and
sufficient to deter the U.S.S.R.
Despite doctrinal disputes between the two camps, a compromise was reached between
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A likely tacit agreement was
reached on supporting a light ABM system. McNamara accepted this since he understood he was
very unlikely to win if his position was only no deployment, considering Johnson’s decision, the
continued unity of the JCS, and the burgeoning pressure in both houses of Congress and many
salient committees.286 However, it seems the JCS declined the press their advantage and
momentum in this milieu to get a heavy system for two reasons. First, a light ABM system got
the Chiefs support since it was couched as a “first step,” leaving it open to expansion later.287
They understood that it would likely expand over time, acting as a “stepping-stone” to a heavier
system, meaning their goal would be achieved eventually, especially in the more granular
planning phases.
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Second was the Army’s waning interest in ABM. As opposed to the 1950s where it had
to fight tooth and nail for relevance and interservice conflict was rampant, the stakes for the
Army on ABM were no longer as high.288 A more diverse and better funded set of missions,
especially those surrounding limited war and insurgency like in Vietnam, had relative
prominence over the ABM question now.289 The preoccupation of the Army, still the largest
proponent of ABM, with the land war in southeast Asia meant it was not as interested in the
more difficult legislative and bureaucratic fight required to get a heavy system. This was
probably especially true since McNamara had again hitched the heavy anti-Soviet system to
toxic civil defenses which few of the Army’s Congressional supporters would be enthused about
having to defend. Thus, the Army seemed “quite prepared” to accept a limited system in 1967 to
finally get deployment going.290
During this period, the Soviet interest in talks had been plumbed and found to be
amenable. There had been communication between embassies as well as a few letters between
Johnson and Chairman Alexei Kosygin, where Johnson unsubtly explained, “I face great
pressures from the Members of the Congress and from public opinion not only to deploy
defensive systems in this country, but also to increase greatly our capabilities to penetrate any
defensive systems which you might establish.”291 Johnson and McNamara saw an opportunity in
the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in which Israel decisively defeated a coalition of Arab
states including Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In the aftermath of the conflict, Kosygin was planning
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to speak at the United Nations in New York, and a summit was hastily organized at Glassboro
State College in New Jersey.292 While efforts at arms control would have to come far behind the
Arab-Israeli conflict and Vietnam during the summit, Johnson thought he and McNamara could
convince Kosygin of their good intentions.293
The Glassboro Summit, held June 23rd to the 25th, 1967, was ultimately a disappointment,
as Kosygin appeared unreceptive to Johnson’s broader appeals to ideals of war and peace or
McNamara’s analytical, military-technical arguments. After hearing the Secretary of Defense’s
presentation on strategic arms control, he complained about a lack of interest in offensive
limitations, and “maintained that Soviet ABMs were purely defensive and so posed no threat to
the other side.”294 Eventually Kosygin even shouted, “defense is moral, aggression is
immoral!”295 While Kosygin’s positions likely reflected the dominance of the Soviet military in
defense policymaking and the lack of intellectual work done on the effects of missile defenses to
the strategic balance, the Johnson administration was deflated and bearish on the prospects of an
ABM freeze after the summit.296
As diplomatic prospects withered that summer, preparations for announcing the ABM
commenced. As a consolation to McNamara, who he still wanted a good relationship with,
Johnson allowed him to announce the deployment in whatever way he wanted. By early August
the President’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow informed Johnson the Defense Secretary intended
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to hold a speech in mid-September to announce the new system.297 This resulted in a flurry of
notifications and consultations with allies and partners, as well as the preparation of a public
relations blitz to follow the announcement. This included interesting discussions with the
Canadian Defense Minister and Ambassador, where the Canadians turned down an offer to get
involved in the system since “at the moment Canada is violently anti-ABM” and they assessed
there was less than a 1% chance of the government agreeing to it.298 Once again alert to the
vagaries of domestic politics, Spurgeon Keeny urged Walt Rostow to convince McNamara that
the speech should be given in January instead. If done in January, “the announcement would be
submerged” somewhat “in the many other problems and decisions in the FY-1969 budget.”299
Keeny was joined by the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who
thought the announcement might sour negotiations for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.300 Nevertheless, McNamara held to the mid-September announcement date.
While there was enough pressure to get an ABM decision across the finish line
interagency and intercabinet dynamics allowed McNamara to secure the limited, China-oriented
ABM for 1967. The clear implications for domestic politics encouraged Johnson to move
forward with an ABM, leaving its character to be largely determined by the other actors
involved. The Army’s flagging interest and the Chiefs astute assumption that the system would
spread encouraged them to compromise with McNamara. Neither side got what they truly
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wanted, and therefore a system whose explicit mission was largely nonsensical, as China did not
pose a severe ballistic missile threat and Sentinel was not configured to defend against the
SLBMs or cruise missiles the PRC had, moved forward. The intense bureaucratic fight, spurred
by changing interpretations of the arms race by domestic politics, produced this strange system
by the end of the Johnson administration.
The King’s Wizard’s Speech
On September 18th, 1967, Robert McNamara addressed the editors of United Press
International in San Francisco. The speech is puzzling, yet significant. It began with a discussion
of the futility of nuclear superiority in megatonnage or number of warheads or launchers when
confronted with an assured second strike. He continued to describe the Soviet ABM, the U.S.
offensive reaction to Galosh, and comment on the U.S.’s efforts on missile defense. McNamara
clearly outlined his critiques of ABM, noting the cost, $40 billion or multiples thereof, as well as
the Soviet ability to saturate a defense with more offensive warheads. He said “this is the whole
crux of the nuclear action-reaction phenomenon. Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system
throughout the United States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their
offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage.”301 McNamara told the audience of
the scientific consensus behind this conclusion, and further argued “There is no point whatever
in our responding by going to a massive ABM deployment to protect our population, when such
a system would be ineffective against a sophisticated Soviet offense.”302 McNamara concluded
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this part of his speech with a warning that we must not “trigger a senseless spiral upward of
nuclear arms.”303
The argument then took a sharp turn. McNamara said it was important to distinguish
between a system to protect against Soviet attack and one designed to defend strategic offensive
forces or from a Chinese attack.304 He discussed China’s progress since their first nuclear test in
1964, and the benefits of protecting the Minuteman fields from attack.305 However, he repeatedly
emphasized the light and limited nature of this defense, and called for resistance to the inevitable
“temptation” to expand it “into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM,” lamenting the “mad momentum
intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry.”306 McNamara feared the inexorable
push for more weapons and greater superiority, and worried about the effects of adding an
offense-defense competition to the already dangerous and costly arms race.
The second half of McNamara’s speech was jarring and confusing for many, who had
just listened to a diatribe against nuclear superiority and the folly of ABM systems. However, it
makes sense considering the choices available to the Secretary and his profound concern about a
potential heavy ABM. Fred Kaplan relates a conversation between Paul Warnke, then Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and McNamara during the drafting
process for the speech. Warnke asked “China bomb, Bob?” McNamara allegedly looked
downcast, shuffled some papers around, and replied “what else am I going to blame it on?”307
McNamara saw the China threat rationale as indefensible, and hoped that would help raise
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opposition to the ABM. In early 1968, Robert McNamara left the Department of Defense to
become the President of the World Bank. His differences with Johnson over the conduct of the
Vietnam War had become too significant and troublesome. McNamara compiled his major
speeches into a book, The Essence of Security, which only included the first part of the San
Francisco speech. The latter part, which “served his purposes as a bureaucrat under pressure but
embarrassed him as an intellectual,” was squirreled away in an appendix.308
After the decision to deploy a light ABM was taken, the implementation of the plan was
turned over to the Army, and largely overseen by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Nitze.
Nitze was interested in keeping the possibility of expansion to a heavier or larger system open.309
Additionally, the Army oversaw selecting the precise sites for radars and missile launchers for
the system. In order the lay the groundwork for a more expansive system, they chose sites close
to cities, and eventually “the Army was able to tell the Congress that actual deployment was not
different in any significant way from the projected first stages of an anti-Russian system, and that
the system being deployed was expected to grow.”310 It seemed McNamara was unsuccessful in
placing guardrails on the expansion of the limited system through his speech.
Another development that would belie the success of the effort to frame the system as
limited and oriented at China rather than the Soviet Union occurred earlier that summer. A report
from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research cataloged the 11th test of a
probable Soviet FOBS on August 8th, suggesting a “major effort” on the part of the U.S.S.R.311 It
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was assessed that the FOBS used the new SS-9 missile, and could deliver a 5 megaton warhead
over the south pole, “without our present Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
being able to provide tactical warning.”312 While the report concluded that the FOBS was
unlikely to upset the “basic strategic balance,” it did recognize the system “can also serve to
complicate the US problem of developing an effective ABM defense.”313 The Soviets were likely
also skeptical of the China rationale, and were finalizing a responsive system prior to
deployment. The Soviet FOBS was declared operational July 21st.314
The contradictions of McNamara’s speech laid bare the confusion and awkwardness of
the system produced by the process discussed above. The compromise between the military and
civilian leadership of the Pentagon produced something with an explicit justification that made
little sense. This discrepancy was exacerbated by the competing visions McNamara and the
military had for the future of the system. McNamara saw Sentinel as the area defense component
and 25 cities defended by Sprints. Paul Nitze and others within the defense bureaucracy,
however, began planning to build an eventual heavy defense, despite the declared limited role of
the system. This was problematic considering implementation had been ceded by McNamara to
Nitze and others. These elements indicate that even though McNamara was leaving the DOD and
the decision to pursue an anti-China system had been taken, the bureaucratic fights would linger,
and the system would continue to change as various actors with diverse agendas wrangled for
control. Had the protests of 1968 not materialized, activating another aspect of the peculiar
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domestic politics of the arms race, Sentinel might have slowly expanded into the heavy antiSoviet ABM McNamara feared.
Nuclear NIMBYism: 1968
Now that the broader policy questions surrounding ABM had been settled, 1968 was
characterized by planning as the shape of what was now known as Sentinel came into focus. In
November 1967, the Army had published an initial list of 10 potential Sentinel Sites, and by
December 1968, had expanded the list to 17 sites.315 Some potential locations included Albany,
Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas Texas; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; New York,
New York; Oahu, Hawaii; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Washington; Boston, Massachusetts;
and Detroit, Michigan. The sites were initially not going to house Sprint interceptors, since a thin
defense would rely more on the long-range Spartans, but in the event a decision was taken to
expand the scope of the system, the Army wanted the sites to be close enough that the cities
could be defended with the Sprint missiles.316 Considering the range of the Sprint was relatively
short, around 40 miles, this required the sites to be closer to population centers to provide
adequate coverage.317 As Sentinel planning proceeded, local citizens were informed about the
plans to construct the ABM sites near them, triggering a cascade of protests which would prevent
the Army’s program of heavy population defense from ever coming to fruition.
The initial interest in the site announcements generally came from scientists who had
been paying attention to ABM. In Illinois, for example, researchers at Argonne National
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Laboratory were the first to take note of the announcement of an impending nearby ABM site
and inform the local population.318 Similarly, in Seattle, scientists at University of Washington
took the announcements to residents.319 Anti-nuclear weapons organizations were also helpful in
raising awareness of the plans, especially in Boston. Organizations formed in response to a
growing understanding of the Army’s proposals, including Citizens Against the ABM, which
helped coordinate various campaigns to stop the sites. There were distinct strategies taken by
opponents of ABM. While older residents generally wrote to their representatives and set up
petitions, younger groups wanted to picket and march, with the elder’s strategy generally
prevailing.320 There were many public meetings where residents could engage with poorly
prepared Army officials who were confronted by both experts asking pointed questions about
technical problems, and citizens’ concerns about the effects the installations would have on their
neighborhoods.321 Many experts and scientists who had previously been in PSAC or ARPA were
available as they had left government over Vietnam.322 An often returned to point by citizens was
that “the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China was far less pressing than other fears far
closer to home.”323
These more proximate fears were varied, yet often profound for these residents,
motivating large and successful protest movements. In some ways, their reticence to cooperate
with the Army reflected the loss of confidence in the military during the Vietnam War.324 People
were less trusting in the late-1960s than they had been in the 1950s when they had welcomed the
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Nike-Ajax and Hercules batteries. This skepticism materialized in concerns about accidents or
low altitude interceptor detonations, as well as worries that these installations would turn their
cities into “megaton magnets,” drawing more warheads the way the Moscow system had.325
Moreover, people fundamentally did not want to be reminded of the ever-present nuclear threat
embodied in these defense sites.326 However, worries about accidents or the military facets of the
ABM were less pressing to residents than other issues.
People were often concerned about the impact of the new ABM sites on the “green
spaces” in their suburban neighborhoods. Residents wanted to preserve recreational spaces and
“unspoiled parkland” which they felt was being taken up by new housing developments, and
environmental degradation was seen as the third most pressing concern to Americans after
Vietnam and unemployment by 1969.327 This attitude had been successfully wielded by the
Johnson administration to help pass several Great Society environmental protections such as the
Water Conservation Act or the Air Quality Act. The Army, however, drew the ire of those
worried about the environment and green spaces in their neighborhood when they designated
undeveloped open spaces in suburban areas as the probable sites for the ABM.328
Another criticism was tied up in the emerging socio-economic concerns of white
suburbanites in the late 1960s. Many residents criticized the development of this new military
boondoggle as they saw it as trading off with efforts to help improve cities that were troubled
and under pressure.329 This zero-sum understanding of government spending viewed the money
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being spent on missile defense as coming out of coffers which could be better used to combat
urban poverty and unrest. These seemed like more pressing issues, especially in 1968 after the
conflagrations following the Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the Black Power
movement, which created fears of insecurity among middle- and upper-class whites which was
entirely unrelated to a nuclear China.330
The implied welfare spending trade off was not the only economic issue protesters saw in
the ABM issue, though. In choosing sites to defend the cities listed above, the Army somehow
managed to select some of the most affluent areas of the country.331 These suburbanites were
deeply concerned about the effect that having nuclear armed ballistic missile interceptors nearby
would have on their property values. Residents were particularly invested in their property values
at that point since they were one of the few assets holding value well in the face of Vietnam and
Great Society induced inflation.332 Making their zip code a “megaton magnet” likely jeopardized
these citizens’ sense of economic security and they were unwilling to sacrifice their wealth for
the goal of national security.
These affluent white suburban protesters were comfortable with other groups being
disadvantaged in this way. The pervasive sentiment was that “if this ‘military-industrial
boondoggle’ needed to be deployed in an urban area, then it should be somewhere uglier and
poorer that had less to lose financially from having Sentinel located in its backyard.”333 These
protests had also met with considerable success. In Seattle, protestors managed to lobby Scoop
Jackson, an essential ABM advocate, to convince the Army to move the site out of a wealthy
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neighborhood to somewhere 20 miles away. By the end of 1968, “this coalition combined the
rhetoric of home and neighbourhood with technical knowledge against what they perceived as an
untrustworthy military elite in Washington” to vociferously challenge Sentinel.334 It was in this
environment of white suburban backlash that Richard Nixon, who defeated Hubert Humphrey
after Johnson declined to seek re-election, took the Presidency, and with it, the task of
implementing the ABM.
The protests which began in 1968 illustrate the peculiar domestic politics of the arms
race. Domestic pressure for a comparable ABM system to the Soviets was important for
convincing the Johnson administration to deploy Sentinel. However, once the implications of
that were felt in wealthy white suburban communities, public opinion on it soured rapidly. The
tension within the domestic politics of the strategic competition is well demonstrated by Scoop
Jackson, who ardently campaigned for the ABM, but whose constituents would not allow it to be
sited near them. The incoming Nixon administration faced the unenviable problem of
synthesizing this angry public reaction to the siting plan with the need for an ABM as determined
by the administrative decision-making process. 1968 demonstrates that for many, the arms race
was just fine, so long as it mostly stayed out of sight.
We’ve Seen the Last of Good King Richard: Nixon, Sentinel, and Safeguard in 1969
The Nixon administration hit the ground running on foreign policy and nuclear weapons
issues. There were some ambitious goals they wanted to accomplish, including a solution to
Vietnam, quelling domestic unrest, and arms control, which encouraged their embrace of
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détente.335 Considering the Vietnam War and a perceived relative decline in U.S. power, the
Nixon Doctrine sought to rely more on regional allies to prosecute the Cold War, allowing U.S.
commitments to be scaled down, while also capitalizing on the emerging Sino-Soviet split.336
This approach, a desire to end the Vietnam War in particular, would ultimately produce better
relations with both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Nixon’s partner in this
effort was Henry Kissinger, a former professor of international relations at Harvard. They
initially operated off an understanding of international relations with the Soviet Union which
subordinated regional conflicts like Vietnam and the arms race to larger geopolitical goals. The
administration, for instance, did not want to consider Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT,
in isolation from Vietnam or other issues, but sought to link them together. This attitude
extended towards Sentinel as well, since even though Nixon was interested in arms control
agreements with the Soviets, he was also “profoundly aware of the domestic political cost of
conceding numerical parity to the Soviet Union in strategic armaments.”337 Therefore, the
administration wanted to reassess nuclear doctrine, the ABM, and foreign policy, to try and
achieve their goals.
Nixon’s re-evaluation of Sentinel took place in February and early March of 1969 and
produced a new arrangement of the Nike-X components with a distinct rationale to justify it. The
change solved some political problems for Nixon and had diverse reasoning behind it. Firstly,
Nixon had been elected by a very slim margin, mainly by reaching out to Southern Democrats
who were alienated by civil rights. He was therefore very sensitive to popular domestic concerns
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which may imperil his re-election.338 He did not want to have to deal with the protests
surrounding the suburban ABM deployments, which might have angered voters early in his
presidency. A report from that February by PSAC noted that “siting near cities has a particularly
bad political effect in the current context of the urban crises,” which was surprising to planners
since “it was thought that as batteries would be installed to protect only a few cities, other
communities would clamor that they wished protection also. Thus far, however, substantial
opposition has been expressed in each city.”339 The public backlash to the city defense
component of Sentinel created powerful incentives for the administration to change course.
The increasing pressure of the protests domestically was complemented by new military
concerns which would justify a shift in the program as well. The Soviet ICBM force was
expanding, particularly the large SS-9 missile. The Soviets were building about 200 ICBMs per
year, which would bring them closer to parity with the U.S. in terms of launchers.340 This was
part of the Soviet reaction to the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis that was referenced earlier.
Moreover, there were concerns about multiple warheads on the SS-9. In June of 1969, it was
reported to Kissinger and Nixon that the Soviets had been testing a multiple re-entry vehicle
(MRV) variant of the SS-9 since August of 1968, Kissinger and Nixon saw as a first step towards
a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) system.341 As the Soviets advanced
their MRV program, reaching greater accuracies, Kissinger and Nixon were concerned they
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would be able to target and kill the Minuteman silos at the fields in the northern Midwest of the
U.S., neutralizing one leg of the deterrent triad.342 Moreover, an expanded Soviet ICBM force
could also threaten the bomber fleet. The extreme worries felt by some were succinctly surmised
by a briefer from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, who concluded “we see new land
mobile ICBM, FOBS, MIRVs. Their R&D may exceed ours by factor of two. Pindown
possible.”343 Pindown referred to a strategy where chronologically staggered nuclear detonations
over silo fields by an adversary would either prevent the missiles in the silos from being
launched or destroy them as they launched during the boost phases. These factors significantly
shaped the Nixon administration’s decisions on ABM in those first few months of the
presidency.
On February 6th, the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, ordered a halt to the entire
Sentinel program until a month-long review could be completed.344 This spurred a flurry of
action in the administration, with reports and proposals being drawn up, as well as outside, such
as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee holding educational hearings on the issue.345 By
February 14th, as indicated by certain NSC meeting talking points, Kissinger had identified five
available choices regarding Sentinel. Proceed with the current program, delay it, redirect the
system to defend the Minuteman fields and put money towards research and development,
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redirect the system to an anti-Soviet posture, or cancel sentinel and proceed with research and
development.346
In evaluating these options, the Nixon administration was as cognizant about the
technical shortcomings of Nike-X as the Johnson administration. A PSAC report on Sentinel and
alternative options conceded that the “unstated objective is to provide the base for a possible
anti-Soviet system,” but “against a large, sophisticated attack such as the USSR could mount in
the same time period, the Sentinel system as such would have little or no value.”347 They further
noted that China had the “technical capability” to develop sufficiently advanced countermeasures
to penetrate the ABM in a few years if they so desired.348 The report further elaborated on the
various alternatives identified by Kissinger in those talking points. Even though those talking
points identified five alternatives, by mid-February, some aspects of the pivot had solidified. In
an NSC meeting on the 14th, Secretary Laird was asked about the ABM by Nixon, remarking “I
think we can cut back the program by $200 million, move some of the sites away from the cities,
but we should go forward. Don’t use it against Soviet Union except for sub launches and
misfires. Say it is to take out 20–25 Chinese ICBMs in a few years.”349 The administration had
already cut the troublesome urban defense component to quell protest. While at that point they
were still holding to the China rationale, the meeting also mentioned that “[Minuteman] could be
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upgraded to an ABM,” which would become the focal point for discussions about alternatives to
Sentinel.350
Using Nike components to defend ICBMs was an old idea, which had been discussed
during the Kennedy years by the Air Force in a bid to wrest control of the ABM mission from
the Army. However, the Nixon administration was also cognizant of the effects of action reaction
in a rather nuanced way, with an NSC staff paper outlining that “understanding the
action/reaction process is complicated by the fact that the current Soviet build-up may have
already anticipated new developments on our part, so that go aheads on new U.S. programs
would not necessarily lead to additional Soviet reactions.”351 This was one of the reasons why
Minuteman defense began to gain credence among Nixon’s advisors. During an NSC meeting on
February 19th, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard noted the Soviets “would see cities
defense as prelude to other offensive build-up” by the U.S., supported by Gerard Smith, Director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who said “population protection is historically a
signal of going for first strike. Would be more threatening.”352A February 25th PSAC report on
the “Active Defense of the Deterrent” pitched it as being less likely to spur a new round of the
arms race as McNamara had predicted since it wouldn’t imperil the Soviet deterrent’s ability to
strike U.S. cities and other countervalue targets and was indistinguishable from other passive
defenses like hardening silos.353
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It is that clear by the end of February the administration had taken ABM installations
near cities off the table and thought a defense of the deterrent increasingly appealing to try and
escape some of the concerning action/reaction dynamics. This consolidated around a scheme
known as Deployment Model 1-69, “a reduced number of sites, Missile Site Radars and
Perimeter Acquisition Radars and missiles,” but with “proposed locations further removed from
cities.”354 1-69 would provide “additional warnings for CONUS-based bombers against SLBMs
and FOBS; some protection against ICBMs, SLBMs, and FOBS; an option for protecting a
portion of Minuteman force.”355 The JCS, in a memo to Laird, noted that while it did “not
provide the necessary capabilities against the primary threat,” it did “add to the overall defensive
capability and strategic posture” and was “compatible with future improvement” meriting their
endorsement.356 Chair of the JCS General Wheeler said he would advocate for an “ABM defense
which gave first strike capability” if it was technically feasible, “destabilizing or not. Wouldn’t
bother me,” but would allow 1-69 as an extension of the compromise they had made under
McNamara.357
This plan was presented to Nixon in an NSC briefing by the DOD and a memo. Kissinger
told Nixon beforehand that “I believe you should approve the DOD plan.”358 The memo laid out
four options for ABM at this point; defend the cities against the Soviets, an area defense against
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China like Sentinel, modified Sentinel, or no ABM.359 It noted the unanimous recommendation
of the JCS and DOD for modified Sentinel, and that the basic physical change “is the improved
directional coverage of the radar system, which protects the bomber bases against Soviet SLBM
or FOBS attack.”360 The report was more trepidatious about the threat to Minuteman than Nixon
and others, arguing it was “not essential to the maintenance of our deterrent” if they “accept
current intelligence estimates of probable Soviet threats.”361 However, even with a changed
emphasis on retaliatory forces, particularly bombers, area defense against China was an
important part of the rationale. The memo articulated that “we could justify the deployment as a
defense against China with the defense of our retaliatory forces as an add-on” or vice-versa.362
The memo, marked up by Nixon, had four handwritten notes on the cover sheet: “1. They have
closed the gap. 2. They continue to increase. 3. They want to talk. 4. We must see that the gap is
not widened on other side.”363 Nixon’s note demonstrates his preoccupation with perceived
Soviet offensive and defensive gains compared to relatively lackluster U.S. programming, and
the conclusion that SALT is the best answer to this to prevent superiority, or even parity, from
being lost.
Modified Sentinel, as outlined in that memo from the DOD, was accepted as the system
the administration would defend going forward. While still defending against a largely
nonexistent threat from China, some of the emphasis would shift to guarding bomber bases from
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SLBM and FOBS attacks and the Minuteman fields from attack. This was announced on March
14th by Nixon, who spoke to the press at a conference.364 The system was also rebranded as
Safeguard at the meeting. During a meeting Nixon held with the bipartisan leadership before the
announcement, the system was explicitly couched as a response to the SS-9 and the threat it
posed, and he assured them that it could not be expanded into a thick ABM defense against the
Soviet Union.365 There was a lingering question at this meeting about why a decision on ABM
had to be taken now. Nixon informed the Congressional leadership that the urgency was because
a delay of six month now would result in a slip in deployment of two years.366 This assessment
of the timetable reflected the arcana of component production and site construction, but also
served Nixon’s goal of rallying hawkish support for the project. Therefore, taking measures then
would ensure the system was operational by 1973.
In addition to changing the course of the ABM, the Nixon administration developed a
new doctrine called “strategic sufficiency.” It became clear that despite the many bullet points
describing what strategic sufficiency meant, for the Nixon administration, “the word
“sufficiency” will always be seen in a political context,” and “the NSC will call sufficiency
whatever it decides upon with regard to strategic forces.”367 However, as NSC member Laurence
Lynn was oft quick to point out, “maintenance of area defense against third countries and
accidents is a Presidentially-approved criterion of strategic sufficiency,” and thus “should be
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given priority.”368 Lynn was a staunch defender of the area defense component of Safeguard, and
over the course of the rest of 1969 became increasingly concerned it would fall through the
cracks of the planning process, intentionally or unintentionally. He was worried DOD, and the
Air Force in particular, would try to scuttle area defense and Safeguard writ large, since “they
want the money for Air Force programs such as hard rock silos and mobile Minuteman, and
Safeguard is directly competitive with these programs.”369 These were valid concerns Lynn held,
since the Safeguard Phase I funding for FY 1971 only covered the Minuteman fields at Grand
Forks and Malmstrom with no money for area defense, and it was the component “least popular
with Congress and the part that draws the fire of the arms controllers.”370 Lynn’s fretting over
area defense reflected both the coming debates over what Safeguard Phase II would look like,
including the questions of defending the National Command Authority in D.C. and the effects of
SALT, as well as the truly ferocious debate which had transpired over Safeguard in Congress the
Summer and Fall of 1969.
The pivot from Sentinel to Safeguard would have increasingly problematic effects,
especially at the technical level, and reflected the new dynamic brought to the decision-making
process by the Nixon administration. The new administration was much more sensitive to the
domestic politics of the arms race. Nixon and others were hugely concerned about the effects of
the ABM protests, which created incentives to change the program. These impulses were
exacerbated by potentially inflated Soviet threats to U.S. superiority or parity, such as the SS-9.
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The new civilian administration was imbued with a need to do something on ABM and move it
away from the cities. The JCS accepted this, as it was still a steppingstone to their desired larger
plan as per their compromise with McNamara. While concerns held by Lynn and others meant
the intercabinet and interagency disputes would continue, for the Nixon administration Safeguard
was a bureaucratically acceptable solution to the domestic political problems raised by Sentinel.
One aspect of domestic politics had been integrated with interagency outcomes. Now it just had
to pass Congress.
Polemics and Prophecy: The Congressional Debate of 1969
As the Nixon administration reached consensus on Safeguard in early March of 1969, it
was already anticipating heavy resistance in Congress, particularly the Senate. Gerry Smith
warned that whatever the rationale for the system ultimately was, it would be “subject to
informed skeptical probing by the Congress, the press, the public and our Allies.”371 This was
elaborated in a memo focused on the issue by Bryce Harlow, the President’s Assistant for
Congressional Relations. Harlow concluded “the ABM system advanced by LBJ has no chance
whatsoever,” and “a modified system can now be passed only with maximum effort, including
all-out Presidential participation.”372 Harlow’s assessment was bleak, arguing that Safeguard
would lose 58-42, one third of Republicans were opposed, and the Republicans Senate leadership
was divided.373 However, he thought 18 of those projected to oppose the plan could be swayed
by “cogently and powerfully advanced” arguments, and “given a total effort, you would prevail
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in the Congress.”374 Harlow presciently observed that many were trying to make it a party issue
of military need versus social need, and Senator Ed Kennedy and others may make it “an issue
that will be ridden into the 1972 election campaign.”375 Harlow’s memo clearly laid out the
domestic political stakes in the fight for an ABM, recognizing the Presidential ambitions
involved and maneuvering required to succeed.
This Congressional confrontation had been foreshadowed in 1968. An amendment had
been introduced to postpone Sentinel by a year and had received 34 votes in the Senate.376
Moreover, those votes were bipartisan. This was an indication of the fight that would come later,
especially as the protests escalated that winter, bringing more attention to the issue. Now that
Nixon was in the White House, Democrats who had abstained from the vote in 1968 for Johnson
would not do so for Nixon. 8 Democratic Senators who had previously abstained ended up
voting against Safeguard in 1969 and 5 Democrats switched their votes from supporting to
opposing.377 However, many Democrat Senators maintained their position, and “the ABM
debates became a divisive battle between liberal and conservative wings of the Democratic Party
in the Senate.”378 In the end, 21 Democrat Senators voted for Safeguard, 16 of them from the
south.379
After the pivot from Sentinel to Safeguard was announced, the administration began its
justification campaign to Congress. An initial flashpoint was couching the program as a response
to the SS-9, as Nixon had done when he announced Safeguard to the bipartisan leadership. This
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rationale was repeated by Secretary of Defense Laird but was contested by the Central
Intelligence Agency. Contravening the administration, CIA Director Richard Helms argued there
was no data to support the SS-9 threat as the administration had articulated it. They were testing
MRVs not MIRVs, meaning the multiple warhead version, the SS-9 Mod 4, was not accurate
enough to kill a Minuteman silo.380 Instead, Helms argued busting the Minuteman silos could
only be done by the single warhead variants, the SS-9 Mod 1 or SS-9 Mod 2, and thus there were
insufficient numbers of the massive Soviet missile to threaten the whole Minuteman force.381
This tension between the CIA and the administration provoked a heated debate in
Congress between two civilian experts, George Rathjens and Albert Wohlstetter. Rathjens was
trained as a chemist and had been Chief Scientist at ARPA before leaving government and
testified to Congress that even if the Soviets had 500 highly accurate, MIRVed SS-9s, a quarter
of the Minuteman force would still survive a Soviet first strike.382 Wohlstetter was a
mathematical logician who had worked in the economics division at RAND until being fired and
continuing at University of Chicago and the Stanford Research Institute, the Army’s think
tank.383 He had produced incredibly influential pieces such as a study on the vulnerability
overseas strategic bomber bases and pioneered a mode of analysis which became incredibly
influential both at RAND and in government.384 Wohlstetter countered that Rathjens had made
factual errors and only 5% of the Minuteman would survive. This became a heated and
impassioned debate between the two over arcane details of nuclear conflict, that demonstrated
“how abstract and esoteric the military-technical debate over ABM had become” as well as “the
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deep levels of mistrust and antipathy that existed between the two sides.”385 The highly visible
debate in Congress between the two undermined confidence in the administration and its plan.
Those in favor of the ABM outside of government were undeterred, however. Dean
Acheson and Paul Nitze established the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy to
advocate for the ABM.386 They brought on Wohlstetter, who in turn recruited some of his
students, namely Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Peter Wilson.387 This remarkably hawkish
collection of future foreign policy influencers who would go on to be key neo-conservatives
worked to support Safeguard in Congress, collaborating with Scoop Jackson and others. The
work of this committee and the Rathjens/Wohlstetter debate demonstrated that presidential
administrations no longer had a monopoly on expert nuclear knowledge. With the profusion of
scientists and experts who had trained in the Kennedy and Johnson administration but had left
government for various reasons, there was a new and large pool of available talent.388 The
contention between the two sides of the debate demonstrated for the first time that the Executive
no longer reflected a unified political and expert consensus on nuclear weapons issues and
opened the door for strong challenges on those topics from Congress and the public in the
future.389
In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved a bill with funding for
Safeguard in a 10-7 vote. This was another ominous sign as this type of bill generally had
unanimous support coming out of committee.390 Nixon considered pivoting yet again, and
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supporting various amendments which were more limited, such as the McIntyre amendment
which would only begin constructing radars and withhold funding for land and missile
purchases.391 However, the administration eventually decided against it and prepared for the
upcoming battle that fall.
Ultimately Safeguard was passed by the Senate that October, and “all the strategic and
ideological arguments notwithstanding,” it was “won through old-fashioned arm twisting and
horse-trading.”392 There were two amendments in the Senate which were locus points of
opposition to Safeguard. First was the Cooper-Hardt amendment, which provided funding for
research and development. but not for deployment. There were also a variety of Smith
amendments, but the one which proceeded the furthest provided funding for research and
development for ABM systems which were not Safeguard, and withheld funding for
Safeguard.393 On the day the Senate was to vote on the funding bill and the amendments, more ill
portents gathered. The most notable was that “as the Senate was gaveled into order, a woman
dressed in black stood up in the gallery and shouted: ‘I prophesy against ABM in the name of
Jesus Christ!’”394 She was removed, and voting commenced. The Cooper-Hardt amendment
failed in a voted of 49-50. The Smith amendment also failed, but at a 50-50 vote tie, Vice
President Spiro Agnew was required to cast the decisive vote in favor of Safeguard.395
The astonishingly close Senate debate on ABM reflected the tenuous domestic political
basis Safeguard rested. This further demonstrates the peculiar nature of the domestic politics of
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the strategic arms competition, and the competing pressures it put on administrations. The lack of
political consensus in Congress was important as it limited Safeguard’s scope to whatever
Congress would support. This situation added another force to the planning process and resulted
in further abstraction from the goals and objectives Nike-X was originally designed for. The
conclusion of this debate reveals how domestic politics as they played out in the Senate were
synthesized with the interagency and intercabinet decision from the Nixon administration to
produce Safeguard, and ultimately Safeguard’s demise in 1975. As 1969 demonstrated, Congress
would influence the Nixon administration’s approach to not only implementing Safeguard Phase
II and SALT but dealing with the need to test one of the nuclear warheads used in the ABM as
well.
Spicy Physics: The Warheads of Nike-X
As Safeguard advanced legislatively, the design and testing of components was being
finalized. Work on the nuclear warheads to be used in Safeguard was coming to fruition. Both
types of interceptors used in the Nike-X system, the Spartan and the Sprint, were designed to use
nuclear warheads to destroy enemy re-entry vehicles. This is very different from modern antiballistic missile interceptors, which have neither a conventional nor a nuclear warhead, relying
instead on the kinetic force of the impact with the target. However, neither the Spartan nor the
Sprint used the explosive or concussive power of nuclear bombs to accomplish this, and the
differences between the warheads reflects the different roles of the interceptors. The Sprint used
a warhead known as the W-66, while the Spartan used the W-71.
The W-66 warhead was designed and built by Los Alamos National Laboratory
specifically for the Sprint interceptors. There is very little publicly available information on the
W-66. Only 70 were ever produced, specifically to deploy on the Sprints in the Safeguard
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installation at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The W-66 was what is known as an “enhanced
radiation warhead” or ERW. ERWs are more commonly known as neutron bombs, which
acquired notoriety during the Carter administration. Instead of generating an explosion to kill an
incoming re-entry vehicle, the W-66 was configured to create much more radiation than a
traditional nuclear device. This means the W-66 had a much lower yield than other warheads,
generating a 1 kiloton explosion. The neutrons produced by the W-66 were supposed to disrupt
the warhead in the enemy re-entry vehicle, causing some of the fissile material in the warhead to
fission before intended and causing it to “fizzle.”396 Since much of the fissile material in the
enemy warhead was prematurely fissioned before it was put into a critical configuration through
implosion by high explosives, a critical mass of fissionable material cannot be created and
therefore neither can a nuclear explosion.397
This method may seem overly complicated compared to the much simpler method of
triggering a massive nuclear explosion near an incoming re-entry vehicle and killing it with the
blast and shock produced by that. Using a more traditional nuclear device is effective for
defending against bombers or cruise missiles since they both operate at comparably lower
altitudes. However, the higher altitudes required for ballistic missile re-entry vehicle interception
have much less air, especially above 60,000 feet. This poses a problem, as blast and shock effects
from a nuclear explosion require a medium, such as air or water, to move through and destroy a
target.398 So even though there is still air, and the interception is still occurring in the
atmosphere, the medium is too thin to adequately transfer the shock and blast effects to kill the
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incoming re-entry vehicle. Therefore, the W-66 was a sensible choice for the Sprint missile and
reflects its role since it could theoretically deal with enemy re-entry vehicles in the atmosphere
after drag had separated the genuine threats from the decoys.
The role and strategy for the interceptor is also reflected in the pairing of the Spartan
missile and the W-71 warhead. The Spartan was created to intercept exo-atmospheric targets,
targets outside of the atmosphere. Space is a vacuum and therefore has no medium for explosive
effects to move through, requiring the same cleverness displayed in the W-66 but with a slightly
different approach. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory designed and produced only about
30 W-71 warheads, matching the number of Spartan interceptors deployed at Grand Forks. The
W-71 was a thermonuclear device and was not an ERW like the W-66. Thermonuclear weapons
use the heat and pressure generated from the explosion of a fission-based primary, to compress
fusion fuel, known as a secondary, with the resulting fusion reaction causing the nuclear
explosion. The secondary of the W-71, which contained the fusion fuel, was covered in a layer of
gold. The gold was added to increase the number of x-rays produced by the warhead, which were
the mechanism the W-71 used to destroy incoming re-entry vehicles. Once the x-rays
hit the outer skin of a warhead they stop, and their energy heats up a very thin
layer of material. That sheath explodes away from the reentry vehicle, producing
an intense shockwave that travels through the warhead. The shockwave is so
intense that it is likely to destroy the structure of the intercepted nuclear weapon.
In addition, plasmas may form on the powered electronics in the reentry vehicle,
causing them to fail from “system generated electromagnetic pulse.”399
The gold layer also played a role in a quirky twist of fate. When the W-71 was eventually
dismantled in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the steep rise in the price of gold in the 1980s
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resulted in it being incredibly valuable.400 So much so, that a Department of Energy official
testifying before Congress remarked that dismantling the W-71 “is a gold mine.”401
This design helped the Spartan fulfill its role as an area defense interceptor, since it could
kill incoming re-entry vehicles in space before they got back into the atmosphere and would have
to be handled by a more distributed and position-based defense. The gold wrapped secondary
and the use of thermal x-rays to kill warheads were not the only distinctive aspects of the W-71.
Spartan also carried one of the higher yield nuclear weapons in the US arsenal during the Cold
War, since “in order to accomplish its formidable mission, its warhead had to yield around five
megatons.”402
Testing Travails and the Problem of Sea Otters
The saga of testing the W-71 warhead was also remarkable and somewhat unique for the
time and reflected the domestic political issues surrounding ABM in the Johnson and Nixon
administrations. It was difficult to truly understand the effects of a warhead designed to be used
exo-atmospherically like the W-71 due to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Signed in 1963 by
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, the LTBT prohibited “nuclear tests in the
atmosphere, in space, and under water” forcing testing to be conducted underground.403 By the
time the decision to deploy an ABM had been taken and the W-71 was ready to be tested, these
prohibitions had long been in place, meaning the warhead could not be tested in the environment
it had been designed for. This precise problem had been one of the major points against the
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LTBT prior to its ratification in 1963, with figures like Edward Teller arguing it would make
testing an ABM warhead impossible.404 This line of reasoning was elaborated on by the
Republican National Committee, which released a report attacking the Kennedy/Johnson
Administration over the treaty, pinpointing that the Soviet Union had already finished tests of
their ABM warhead prior to signing and were therefore far ahead of the U.S.405 The attacks from
Teller and the Republicans were rebutted in part by Harold Brown, then Director of Defense
Research and Engineering at the Department of Defense. He described the research of the U.S.
and the Soviets as being roughly equivalent, and further argued that it was irrelevant due to the
numerical advantage of offensive warheads over defensive interceptors.406 Nonetheless, the
LTBT was ratified 80-14, exceeding the required two thirds majority by 14 votes.
Because of the limitations on testing imposed by the treaty, the test of the W-71 would
have to be conducted underground, making it “by far the largest underground tests yet performed
anywhere.”407 In fact, the approximately five megaton warhead was concluded to be too large for
the Nevada Test Site, where concerns about aftershocks and the venting of radioactive air near
Las Vegas has become a more concerning issue. During the late 1960s there had been seismic
aftershocks of 4.0-4.5 on the Richter scale after tests in the Nevada Test Site as well as some
public outcry by environmental and scientific groups and billionaire Howard Hughes, spurring
the creation of a specialist panel led by Dr. Kenneth Pitzer of Stanford University.408 The
product, the Pitzer report, was released in 1968 and not made public by the Johnson
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administration to prevent public backlash, since it did indicate there could be more serious
aftershocks at the Nevada site, especially for high yield tests.409
Other test sites were considered, including a new central Nevada site and one in the
remote Brooks Mountain Range in central Alaska, but ultimately Amchitka Island in the western
Aleutians was chosen since it was both isolated and cheaper than the Brooks Range site.410 There
were extensive preparations undertaken at Amchitka before the test of the W-71, including the
planned detonation of a one megaton device to calibrate the instruments. This test was postponed
since it would have occurred in the middle of the fierce 1969 Congressional debate over
Safeguard.411 After the approval of funds by the Senate in August of 1969, the Atomic Energy
Commission prepared for Milrow, the calibration test at Amchitka.
The announcement of Milrow, however, provoked significant public outcry, as there were
concerns about whether it would create an earthquake, tidal wave, tsunami, or other problem.412
There was public pressure to lower the yield of the test so it would be less likely to generate
those effects, which was quickly translated into political pressure from the Nixon administration.
Glenn Seaborg, then chair of the Atomic Energy Commission, along with the rest of the AEC
still believed that the full yield Milrow test was necessary to get any valuable information.
Seaborg received a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard saying, “he now found
the technical arguments for one yield or another weak in comparison with the political
considerations,” asking for a lower-yield test.413 This was one of many letters the AEC received
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from Senators and other officials asking for either a delay to assess the impact of testing or for
lower yields. The Canadian government also repeatedly expressed concern about testing in
Amchitka as it could pose some risk to Canadian territory.414
Milrow eventually was conducted “without follow-on earthquakes or tidal waves,” but
swelling of public opinion against testing in Amchitka continued to build as preparations
progressed for Cannikin, the test of the W-71.415 Seaborg, recognizing Nixon’s sensitivity to
domestic political pressures, warned Packard “Cannikin might fail to receive final presidential
approval unless problems of public reaction were resolved.”416 Importantly, this negative
reaction was separate from that which had emerged against ABM, since the connection between
Safeguard and Cannikin was classified. When additional transparency was discussed to defang
the public concerns, Seaborg remarks there was reluctance due to “a fear that it might revive the
domestic ABM debate,” which had been so energetic in 1969.417 A letter from Packard to
Seaborg was more explicit, stating that “officially linking this shot with the Safeguard program
could generate sufficient adverse Congressional and public reaction to jeopardize the entire
Safeguard program.”418
When the news of Cannikin’s yield and purpose did break, in the form of a Washington
Post article, it did not torpedo the entire program. While the AEC was able to field complaints
from the Senate about environmental impact assessments and other repercussions, they also cut a
more cautionary tack because of “an increasingly hostile public. This was not a concern we
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would have had ten, or even five, years earlier-before the environmental movement burst onto
the scene in full vigor in 1969.”419 In spite of the opposition to the test from the public, other
governments, and parts of Congress, Cannikin proceeded onwards.
During the public relations work after the Washington Post article, the Atomic Energy
Commission released some “softening information.” They described a program to remove sea
otters from the area around Amchitka and fly them to Oregon, where they would not be affected
by the test.420 They had thus far removed 600 otters and would fly out 60 more in 1971 before
the test.
A final effort to delay the test materialized at the last minute. Eight environmental
organizations filed an appeal to the Supreme Court asking for a temporary injunction against the
test on the grounds that it violated the National Environmental Protection Act.421 The court
agreed to hear oral arguments both for and against the test only eight hours before the test was
scheduled to occur.422 This case had the potential to delay the test in order to allow for more
thorough argumentation on whether it complied with NEPA and the merits of the test in general.
However, the court ruled four to three in favor of letting the test proceed as planned and
delivered their decision a mere five hours before the scheduled time.423
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On November 6, 1971, on Amchitka Island at the bottom of a shaft drilled 1.76 km deep,
6,150 feet, “a distance equivalent to four Chicago Sears Towers stacked end on end,” the
850,000-pound W-71 was detonated.424 The explosion registered 7.0 on the Richter scale and
uplifted a fault line in the Bering Sea by 42 inches.425 Even though Seaborg had resigned by that
time, his successor James Schlessinger was on the island with a member of his family, as
Seaborg had said he would be willing to be.426 There was minimal damage to the island, with a
few rockslides and eagle’s nests disturbed. The test of the warhead for the Spartan missiles was
the last conducted at Amchitka, prompting Seaborg to remark that “the huge effort that went into
their development and testing can stand as a monument to the futility and wastefulness of the
nuclear arms race.”427 In another monument to futility, a few months after the test, scientists
working for the AEC reported that instead of killing 20-100 sea otters as had been predicted in
the environmental impact assessment, the test had “definitely killed 900-1100 sea otters.”428
Poorly Threaded Needles: 1970, SALT, and Safeguard Phase II
As the plans for testing the W-71 progressed, the Nixon administration was still fighting
to keep Safeguard on track. After Safeguard Phase I was approved, the administration faced the
difficult task of balancing plans for expanding the system in a way that could receive
Congressional approval with making progress at limiting ABMs through SALT. The result was a
tepid expansion in Safeguard Phase II, and a significant blunder at SALT, throwing the utility of
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Safeguard into question and severely constraining the administration’s diplomatic efforts to
constrain the arms race. The administration’s work on determining how to proceed with Phase II
began in early 1970 to be prepared before the opening of the first substantive round of SALT
negotiations at Helsinki in April.
In the aftermath of the Congressional debates in the fall of 1969, Safeguard Phase 1
began with work at the Air Force Bases at Malmstrom and Grand Forks, and the intention of
eventually expanding to a full 12 site defense. Safeguard Phase II as presented by the Nixon
administration to Congress was the addition of one site at Whiteman AFB to protect the nearby
Minuteman fields, as well as commencing preparatory work on five other sites, including one to
defend the National Command Authority in Washington D. C. This was the absolute minimum
they felt they could put forward while maintaining momentum for the system, and it “had all the
hallmarks of a classic bureaucratic compromise.”429 Additionally, Phase II was supposed to be
palatable to Congress, and keep options open for SALT.430 This result was the outcome of
bargaining and debate between NSC members, the DOD, JCS, and ACDA.
One of the most invested members in this debate was again Laurence Lynn, who
continued his crusade to preserve the area defense component of Safeguard from the year before.
Lynn felt area defense was crucial to defending against the Chinese threat, and therefore
supported the addition of the Whiteman site, as well as a site in the Pacific Northwest to that
end.431 It seemed that Kissinger and Nixon shared Lynn’s attachment to area defense, with
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Kissinger stating at a Defense Program Review Committee meeting that “the light area defense is
not negotiable,” and “we should assume that’s what he [Nixon] wants now.”432 However, the
Pacific Northwest site immediately encountered problems, since it had to be in Washington, and
Scoop Jackson would not support it since he was facing re-election in a year, resulting in that site
being cut from the proposal.433 Lynn also wanted to include a site to defend the National
Command Authority, since it would correspond to the Russian Moscow system aiding in SALT,
as well as providing additional warning and defense of the critical command and control
infrastructure in D.C.434
Lynn had few allies in wanting to continue expanding Safeguard along the 12-site plan,
mainly Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard. Yet, Lynn did not seem concerned about
alienating his allies either, often lambasting them for “the deep inadequacy of the Defense
Department’s work on this issue and their fundamental failure to understand what is needed to
present an effective case for this system against determined opposition.”435 Lynn thought that
“Mr. Packard apparently sees FY 71 commitment to all of Phase 2 mainly as a bargaining
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counter for SALT.”436 However, Packard was motivated by the expanding Soviet offensive
threat, warning about the pace of Soviet ballistic missile submarine construction and postulating
that by the mid-1970s, the new re-entry vehicles for the SS-9 Mod 4 would increase accuracy
enough to allow it to bust Minuteman silos.437 Packard thought “the threat against which
Safeguard was configured last year has continued to evolve” and “Phase 1 only would not be
adequate,” and recommended “proceeding with the first step of Phase 2 deployment.”438 Yet, the
Deputy Secretary considered full Safeguard to be insufficient to protect Minuteman, and wanted
to consider hard rock silos and mobility as well.439
Packard’s theories about the ability of the Soviets to overwhelm Safeguard were shared
by Secretary Laird. However, Laird thought the appropriate response might be a new strategic
bomber, the B-1, or the Undersea Long-Range Missile System, which ultimately became the C-4
Trident I SLBM.440 Later in the year, Laird also considered hard rock silos and mobile
Minuteman, and worried that “we could be faced with a situation of devoting substantial and
scarce resources to preserving the current capability in Minuteman at the expense of added
offensive capabilities in the face of a growing threat.”441 In short, Laird was also distressed about
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Minuteman survivability, but wanted to compensate with more offenses rather than investing in
defenses he saw as inadequate.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, led by Gerald Smith, had little influence in
these discussions, but was invested in the success of SALT. They wanted Safeguard Phase II to
stay in research and development instead of deployment to make SALT easier.442 Deferring
deployment could have made the negotiations appear more genuine to the Soviets. However,
many, including Lynn, disputed this argument, suggesting that Safeguard Phase II deployments
would increase the pressure on the Soviets to make a deal.443 This latter argument won out,
especially as Nixon and Kissinger conceived of continuing Safeguard as a bargaining chip
contributing to their SALT position.444
Finally, continuing their trend of becoming less interested in the program they had
vociferously advocated for earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the least interested in Safeguard
Phase II. They did “not endorse the full twelve site program, only the step to be taken in FY
71.”445 Lynn was worried that the Chiefs, and in particular the Army, was more interested in
newer hard point defenses to defend smaller areas than the area defenses of Safeguard. Lynn
noted “the Army, in pushing its alternative hard point defense concepts, is vigorously
poormouthing the Minuteman defense potential of Safeguard,” which, if or when it leaked,
“could significantly strengthen the opposition’s arguments not only against expanding the
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system, but even against the Phase I decision.”446 The “poormouthing” Lynn was referencing
largely came from a study by the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Agency which suggested
Safeguard would only increase the number of Minuteman to survive a Soviet strike by 20, about
2% of the total Minuteman force.447 While this was a projection for the mid-1970s assuming the
Soviets had finished their force modernization, it did point towards some looming technical
problems for Safeguard.
April was a difficult month for Safeguard and the Nixon administration. Bell
Laboratories informed the government they had no interest in working on ABM after they
completed Safeguard Phase II. Lynn put this less subtly in a memo to Kissinger, concluding Bell
Labs “has apparently decided that Safeguard is not worth building.”448 One of Bell’s main
complaints was the components were designed for Sentinel, not Safeguard, and would therefore
not be very effective as the architecture had dramatically changed, with Lynn summarizing that
“the components were designed for one mission and then the politicians changed the mission and
what can you expect.”449 Lynn was irate, acerbically noting “everyone is at fault except Ma Bell
and she, conscience-stricken, won’t have any more of it.”450 Kissinger, diplomatically translating
Lynn’s report into a memo presentable to Nixon, informed the President that “while the system
will meet the technical specifications set for it, it is their belief that its contribution to military
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missions will be very slight.”451 The Minuteman defense could be defeated by attacking the
radars with a few warheads, simple Chinese penetration aids could “shrink the area defense
coverage to insignificance,” and it would not be effective at protecting the bombers from
SLBMs.452 Kissinger concluded that “these arguments coming from the mouths of the senior
officials of the company in charge of building the system, are potentially devastating.”453
Kissinger was likely correct that if it became more widely known that the company which built
and designed Safeguard had little confidence in its ability to achieve its purported mission, the
already fragile Congressional basis for the program would crumble and it would be a major
embarrassment for the administration which had fought so hard for Safeguard.
Disaster on the technical level was accompanied by disaster at the diplomatic level. The
first substantive phase of SALT began in April as well, and the administration’s opening position
was the product of intense infighting between ACDA, the State Department, and the Defense
Department, and seemed to take no notice of the domestic politics surrounding ABM.454 The
U.S. proposed limiting ABM to low-levels of interceptors to defend National Command
Authorities, or capitals. The fundamental problem with this position was the Soviets had such a
system, but the U.S. did not, was in the midst of building an entirely different system, and only
tentative plans to begin construction on an NCA defense. The Soviets were quick to recognize
this, and accepted this agreement in principle on defenses, while rejecting the much tougher U.S.
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proposal on offensive arms, trying to delink negotiations about offensive and defensive arms.455
This savvy move by the Soviets effectively deprived the U.S. of Safeguard as a bargaining chip.
While negotiators would try until May of 1971 to recover from their slip up at SALT, the
administration still had to get Safeguard Phase II through Congress. By July they had concocted
a rationale for Safeguard Phase II. Outlined by Kissinger at a Defense Program Review
Committee meeting, they wanted “Safeguard to provide against accidents, a minor attack from a
major country or a major attack from a minor country.”456 While Packard worried about budget
cuts affecting area defense, pondering whether to just leave Safeguard in research and
development, Kissinger insisted, with the support of Gerry Smith at this point, “Safeguard is a
card we need during SALT. It is the program of greatest interest to the Soviets.”457 However, by
August 10th, Packard noted “our Congressional people tell us that we are now one vote ahead in
Congress,” but that they “only want to continue the current program” and not recommend
anything more expansive than Phase II.458 A few days later, the Senate once again took up the
issue of Safeguard. They ultimately eliminated funding for preliminary work at any area defense
sites, only authorizing preparation for additional Minuteman sites. Another version of the
Cooper-Hardt amendment was defeated, 47 votes to 52, which would have prevented the
Whiteman preparations as well as preliminary work at another Minuteman site.459 This victory
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was hard won, requiring the circulation of a letter by Gerry Smith stating continued deployments
were crucial to SALT, and was ultimately the end of Congressional debate on the issue.460
Over the course of 1970, between Congress and the Nixon administration, Safeguard was
pared down to a defense of Minuteman, a role it was not designed for and, according to its
designer, would be marginally effective at. The intercabinet and interagency debate produced
tepid support for expansion towards the originally planned 12 site system. ACDA, the Army, and
Laird were either uninterested or skeptical, Lynn and Packard thought it important for the
military balance, and Nixon and Kissinger saw it as an important part of SALT. The NCA bungle
at SALT further demonstrates the deleterious effect the complex decision-making process had on
the ABM. The dramatic revisions to ABM conducted during the first two years of the Nixon
administration reveal the problems and confusion generated by the integration of the interagency
and intercabinet debates with the domestic politics of the arms race, and the peculiar programs it
produced. While the arms race had spurred the construction of a U.S. ABM system under
Johnson, domestic politics and interagency bickering under Nixon ensured it had become
strategically meaningless.
Wheeling and Dealing: 1971-1972
The first task for the Nixon administration in 1971 was reconciling Safeguard with their
SALT position. This required the integration of an NCA defense into the ABM system and
managing to get that through Congress. Kissinger was thoroughly upset the administration found
itself in this position, complaining “we are building an area defense which we can’t have,
justifying a missile defense which won’t work and negotiating an NCA defense we don’t
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want.”461 Packard was not very interested in NCA defense, stating “the only reason to go ahead
is for an agreement,” and observing “we will have trouble justifying it.”462 However, they were
aware they had few options, as Kissinger wondered out loud at a Verification Panel meeting,
“how can we object to asking for authorization for NCA if we are proposing it to the Russians?
How can we convince the Russians we’re serious?”463 Gerry Smith observed, at SALT “our
bargaining power depends on our program having bi-partisan support in Congress” and needing
to ask for an NCA defense might have jeopardized that.464
Concerns about Congress’s reaction to proposals for defending Washington D.C. had
stymied concrete plans for an NCA defense the year before. It could activate the same types of
protests seen in 1969 which had scuttled Sentinel, and the optics of carving out a defense for the
politicians and generals would be rather negative.465 Moreover, Laurence Lynn had noted that
Scoop Jackson, whose support was crucial in the Senate, opposed an NCA defense in 1970 “on
the ground that it introduces unnecessary complications into the debate.”466 Congress’
anticipated skepticism was therefore priced into the calculations the administration was making
about how to proceed with ABM in 1971.
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As more technical criticism of Safeguard in the Minuteman defense role was absorbed,
especially in the Department of Defense, hard-site defense became a larger part of the discussion.
A Verification Panel meeting was held to determine the distinction between hard-site defense
and Safeguard. The biggest change was disaggregating the radars, using many smaller, low
quality radars, rather than a few high quality radars like the MSR.467 Another change was it
would rely on many more interceptors, with one projection concluding 700 interceptors would be
used to defend 100 Minuteman ICBMs.468 Kissinger recognized this would hugely impact SALT
as they would need to negotiate a high limit on interceptors, with Packard thinking “we can’t put
a limit on interceptors.”469 Hard-site defense could not defend against SLBMs either, only the
ICBM corridors, due to radar placement and having fewer radar faces than the MSR or MAR.
However, Gerry Smith assessed beginning work on a hard-site defense would make SALT
appear disingenuous and would struggle in Congress. This appeared to be the accepted view in
the rest of the administration, as moves towards deploying a hard-site defense were absent from
any of the proposals the administration ultimately considered.
By mid-January, other proposals had been put together by other agencies like the Defense
Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. According to Ronald Spiers, the
Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the State Department, DOD wanted funding
for 1000 psi hardening for Minuteman silos, four Safeguard sites, preparation for an NCA site,
and preparation for a mobile ICBM.470 This was elaborated by Laird in a memo to Nixon,
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arguing that “abandoning area defense may be, on balance, a proper price to pay to achieve a
strategically acceptable agreement with the Soviets.”471 Laird was still worried about Minuteman
survivability, but thought that mutual offensive reductions might be a better solution than
building defenses, complementing his skepticism from the previous year.472 Spiers noted that the
“general view” was that the DOD proposal should be scaled down “to minimize the difficulties
both for the negotiations and in Congress.”473 ACDA also proposed 1000 psi hardening for
Minuteman, but wanted a minimum rate of construction at Grand Forks and Malmstrom, deferral
of the Whiteman site, and studies performed on NCA defense.474
By the end of January, these various positions were synthesized into a set of alternatives
in an NSC paper. There was a “high level” option which would move forward on the Grand
Forks, Malmstrom, Whiteman, and Warren sites, as well as begin planning for an NCA site.475
The “intermediate level” would continue work on Grand Forks, Malmstrom, and Whiteman,
make beginning work at Warren contingent on the outcome of SALT, and plan for an NCA
site.476 Finally, the “low level” would just authorize progress on Malmstrom and Grand Forks.477
The report also noted that “Congress rejected the Washington site last year,” and concluded that
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if they asked “for less than full construction for the four sites for Minuteman defense, it can be
argued that we will minimize Congressional opposition.”478 These options were passed on to
Nixon by Kissinger, who included one more alternative which was to continue with Grand Forks,
Malmstrom, and Whiteman, while choosing either Warren or the NCA site depending on the
outcome of SALT.479 This was the option Kissinger recommended and Nixon chose, which
artfully skirted a full debate about an NCA site.480 Kissinger reported it was “generally agreed
that we should request authorization for advance preparation for the NDA defense” to
“determine whether we can get Congressional support for the NDA and relates our Safeguard
proposal to our SALT position.”481 While this did bear some risk of getting rejected by Congress,
Kissinger concluded “it would still be more prudent to rely upon the Congress than upon the
Soviets.”482
As this approach to expanding Safeguard and mollifying Congress was being determined,
talks with the Soviets continued, with the goals of breaking the Soviets insistence on an NCA
only ABM agreement and holding a summit. The emphasis put on the summit reflected Nixon’s
true goals for SALT, and international agreements in general, which was to win domestic
political battles. He wanted to use them to “break the back of this generation of Democratic
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leaders.”483 This was becoming ever more important to Nixon as public opinion soured over the
invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shootings.484 The Soviets recognized Nixon’s domestic
focus and sensitivity, with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States,
advising the Kremlin to manipulate Nixon’s re-election chances to get a better agreement for the
Soviets.485 Kissinger finally managed to get Dobrynin and the Soviets to drop their insistence on
the NCA-only language for ABM negotiations and pursue negotiations of an offensive and
defensive agreement at the same time by calling and telling Dobrynin that Nixon was furious.486
Dobrynin was worried Nixon’s personal characteristics may jeopardize any agreement and
broader relations, and on May 12th he dropped the NCA-only ABM position.487 This produced
the May 20 agreement, whose announcement was “pure domestic political theater, designed to
outflank Nixon’s Democratic critics, who were themselves limbering up for the 1972 contest.”488
This agreement was a joint statement that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would focus on an ABM
agreement and “certain measures” on offenses.489
While the agreement began a reconciliation with Democratic doves which would last
until Watergate, Nixon’s conservative allies had to be reassured.490 Hawks like Stennis and
Jackson worried the connection between the offensive and defensive talks was too loose, which
was correct. Nixon, however, needed the support of these more hawkish Senators to demonstrate
a wide base of support for SALT.491 His solution was to simply lie to Jackson, saying there was
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an explicit, but secret, linkage between offenses and defenses, and Jackson had to keep quiet
about it.492 Later, getting SALT approved by the Senate required not only emphasizing the U.S.
lead in MIRVs and aggrandizing Soviet production of SSBNs, but the approval of the B-1
bomber and Trident SLBM programs as well in order to pacify Republicans and hawks who felt
worried about the agreement.493
The domestic hurdles surrounding Safeguard were still problematic. Congress not only
killed consideration of Warren or an NCA defense in their debates over the FY 1972 budget but
had withdrawn their authorization for the Whiteman site as well.494 This continued resistance
meant Safeguard proceeded on a minimum energy trajectory for another year, with the Grand
Forks construction approximately 80% complete by February 1972.495 Taken with the acceptance
of the very tenuous connection between offenses and defense recognized in the May 20
agreement, it appeared that “Nixon and Kissinger accepted that domestic political opposition
now made Safeguard an almost useless bargaining chips at SALT.”496
After the May 20 agreement, Nixon was determined to have a summit with the Soviets,
and Dobrynin insightfully recognized the optics of summitry were more important to Nixon than
the substance of the agreement made there.497 The Soviets acceded to the high-profile meeting to
take place in late May of 1972, with a final round of SALT occurring earlier that month in
Helsinki. However, even though they had accepted the summit, the Soviets were not budging on

492

Ibid, 148.
Ibid, 158-159
494
United States Department of Defense, “F.Y. '73 Safeguard Rationale [Attached to Cover Memorandum],” Top
Secret, Background Paper, February 12, 1972, DNSA, https://www.proquest.com/government-officialpublications/f-y-73-safeguard-rationale-attached-cover/docview/1748543681/se-2?accountid=7103 (accessed
November 7, 2021).
495
Ibid.
496
Cameron, The Double Game, 141.
497
Ibid, 153.
493

130

significant disagreements over SSBNs and other issues.498 Even at the final round at Helsinki,
less than a month before the summit, the Soviets were holding firm on ABM talks. The U.S.
ultimately had to accept, with the pressure of the summit looming, that each party would get two
ABM sites, with one of them being the National Command Authority, locking the U.S. into de
facto inequality as Congress had rejected an NCA site.499 However, Nixon felt compelled to
outline the stakes to Dobrynin that an agreement be reached, “in effect asking Dobrynin to get
the White House out of its domestic political predicament.”500 Nixon said there had to be highprofile agreements at the summit, and the Soviets needed to make concessions to appease the
hawks, “otherwise the American public would consider the summit a failure.”501
The SALT I Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were signed by Nixon and
Brezhnev May 26th, 1972. Nixon’s notion that he desperately needed an agreement from the
Moscow summit produced a deeply uneven outcome. On offensive forces, the U.S was allowed
44 SSBNs with 656 SLBMs, with the option for 54 more SLBMs if they retired the older Titan I
ICBM, and 1054 ICBMs.502 The Soviets were allowed 62 SSBNs with 950 SLBMs, but only if
they retired the SS-7 and SS-8 missiles, as well as 1618 ICBMs.503 The ABM Treaty was
separate from SALT, however, and more egalitarian. It restricted each party to two ABM sites,
one of them being the NCA, with 100 interceptors per site.504 It further restricted the parties to
two large phased-array radars per site, colloquially known as “battle management radars,” and 18
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less capable radars per site.505 Each site would have a radius of 150 km, and the radars confined
to six complexes with three km diameter within the site.506 The treaty further prevented the
development of “sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based” ABM systems, and
the transfer of ABM interceptors or radars to third parties.507 The ABM Treaty was ratified by
the Senate August 3rd, and entered into force October 3rd, 1972. The rejection of defenses
embodied in the treaty codified mutual vulnerability between the two largest nuclear powers.
Mutual vulnerability, the idea that each side is vulnerable to nuclear attacks by the other, is one
of the foundational pillars of deterrence.
The Nixon administration’s sprint to a SALT deal in 1971 and 1972 embodied many of
the problems highlighted earlier. Safeguard’s shortcomings in the Minuteman defense role
provoked more disunity at the interagency and intercabinet levels as parts of the DOD floated a
completely new system and architecture, hard-site defense. However, hard-site defense was
rejected because the administration had already sold Safeguard to Congress, and it might have
undermined SALT. The interagency process contributed to the disjuncture between the actual
Safeguard plan and the SALT negotiating position. However, the domestic politics of the arms
race precluded an NCA site, compromising the administration’s SALT strategy. The difficulty of
navigating these myriad actors, motivations, and limitations underscores how problematic the
result of integrating the domestic politics of the arms race with interagency and intercabinet
debates could be. These tumultuous circumstances produced the incredibly limited and
ineffectual single Safeguard deployment at Grand Forks.
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Denouement
It is important to keep in mind that none of these systems, their development, production,
and deployment, are free. There is always a cost, usually monetary, but sometimes in lives. There
is no such thing as a bloodless or costless arms race. It is difficult to assess the cost of Nike-Ajax
because spending records before 1962 are either fragmentary or incredibly aggregated.508 The
numbers are much clearer for the other systems since they were deployed or developed after
1962. Nike-Hercules cost $7 billion from 1962-1995, not including the cost of its nuclear
warheads.509 Nike-Zeus still managed to cost $3.2 billion despite never being deployed or
produced.510 The cost of testing and maintaining some Nike-Zeus interceptors as anti-satellite
weapons from 1963 to 1967 cost $53 million. $9.2 billion was spent on Nike-X, and $21.3
billion was spent on Safeguard.511 In sum, approximately $40.7 billion was spent on the
programs discussed here, not including the cost of developing and producing the nuclear
warheads. These vast sums of money put towards a system with an operational life of a handful
of months suggest the hollow nature of this type of strategic competition.
In 1974, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a protocol to the 1972 ABM treaty. The
protocol further restricted each party from two ABM sites to one, requiring each party to choose
to defend either their National Command Authority or an ICBM field.512 The Soviets chose to
retain the Moscow system, and the U.S. chose to defend one of its ICBM fields. The Stanley R.
Mickelsen Safeguard Complex near Grand Forks, North Dakota, reached its initial operational
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capability on April 1st, 1975.513 In addition to the 30 Spartan and 70 Sprint interceptors, it used a
MSR and set of PARs to defend 150 Minuteman missiles.514 It became fully operational October
1st that year. On October 2nd, the House of Representatives voted to shut down the installation.515
In a series of close votes that November, the Senate elected not to close down the facility
entirely, but decided instead, in a 52-47 vote, to just keep the radar operating.516 In February of
1976, the Army stopped radiating the radar, and began removing the interceptors and their
warheads from their cells.517 Safeguard had finally died.
The ABM Treaty would go on to provide the bedrock for arms control and strategic
stability between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, later the Russian Federation, until the George
W. Bush administration abrogated the treaty 2002. In the post-Cold War world, and particularly
the post 9/11 world, the second Bush administration was no longer comfortable with the premise
of mutual vulnerability, seeking to defend against threats from North Korea and elsewhere.
While the decision to start building ABM systems again was taken in the wake of a dramatic
reevaluation of the nature of national security threats and strategic conceptual paradigms, it has
been profoundly deleterious. Missile defenses have risen to be one of the most prominent issues
in nuclear weapons and arms control. Many facets of the situation the U.S. found itself in from
the late 1950s through the early 1970s have returned, and the same arms race dynamics of
competition between offenses and defenses are manifesting again. Since leaving the ABM treaty,
the U.S. has installed the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system in Alaska and California for
national missile defense and pursued other missile defense and defeat programs under the
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Missile Defense Agency.518 This agency has spent over $174 billion since 2002 “for the purpose
of detecting, tracking, and defeating enemy ballistic missiles,” with programs to defend against
ICBMs meeting very limited success.519 This trend is likely to continue, with $20.4 billion for
missile defense and defeat requested in the 2022 budget.520 The United States appears committed
to pursuing defenses, following a path similar to that taken in the 1960s and 1970s.
In March, 2018, Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation, announced a slate
of new programs to defeat these U.S. ABM systems, drawing on ideas originally generated in
response to the Strategic Defense Initiative.521 These include hypersonic glide vehicles, a nuclear
powered nuclear armed underwater drone, and a nuclear powered nuclear armed cruise missile,
among others.522 This has been accompanied by rather explicit statements from the Russian
government arguing that the next round of nuclear arms control treaties must cover missile
defenses, or else agreement will be extraordinarily unlikely.523 The People’s Republic of China,
on the other hand, has taken the more traditional route to defeating missile defenses. Eschewing
Putin’s wacky doomsday McGuffins, in October 2021 China tested a Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System.524 Although the Soviets stopped deploying their FOBS after the early
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1980s, it is still a relatively simple and prudent means of defeating missile defenses.525 It is more
effective now since none of the current ABM radars used to queue U.S. national missile defenses
can track a target coming over the South Pole, whereas the MSR in Safeguard had 4 faces to
cover most attack angles. These technical developments have been accompanied by explicit
Russian nuclear threats surrounding their invasion of Ukraine which began in February 2022.
While the threat of nuclear war did not fade with the end of the Cold War, Putin’s use of nuclear
threats to cover the invasion of another country further suggests the enduring salience of these
issues. Unfortunately, the competition between offenses and defenses that so terrified
McNamara, Vance, and others appears to be in full swing 50 years later.
A granular, bureaucratic history of the first time the United States grappled with the
problem of ABM, like this one, is valuable for those interested in the topic and policymakers
faced with the contemporary incarnation of this problem. It can help make sense of the myriad
influences on ABM policy in the United States, from domestic politics to interservice and
bureaucratic rivalries. The investigation of Sentinel and Safeguard suggest that instead of being
responsive to genuine threats, as assessed by intelligence estimates or administration consensus,
these programs were highly impacted by those domestic and interagency politics. Moreover,
achieving a better understanding of how these programs and policies are produced through such
complex and contentious interagency and intercabinet debates demonstrates why programs
succeed, fail, or become mutated beyond being useful. The programs produced by this process
were often bureaucratic compromises caught between diverse agendas, seeking to please many
audiences at once but often sating none. This conclusion demonstrates the importance of decisive
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decision-making and implementation, and the problems facing those who sought to build
consensus through this interagency and intercabinet process.
Additionally, examining these events can elucidate the conditions which propel these
types of policies forward and suggest ways to moderate and curb the worst excesses of them.
Recognizing the impact of the domestic politics, and how it can oversimplify and push for more
aggressive arms racing, is important for grappling with these issues. The Eisenhower
administration’s decisions demonstrated that ignoring more hawkish domestic voices is
sometimes necessary to make good policy, but they also suffered electoral consequences because
of it. However, it is possible to temper those impulses for arms racing through organization and
protest. Making nuclear weapons feel proximate to individuals and communities can have
significant effects on attitudes towards programs, which can be harnessed to change policy. Most
importantly, this story demonstrates how futile and wasteful arms races can be and cautions
against recklessly pushing forward with attempts to make ourselves invulnerable, especially at
the cost of negotiation and arms control.
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Appendix

Figure 1: Missile Site Radar at the Mickelson Safeguard Complex near Grand Forks, North
Dakota. | “5. Distant view of west oblique of missile site control building. To right can be seen
intake and exhaust of MSRPP, on far right is accessway - Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard
Complex, Missile Site Control Building, Northeast of Tactical Road; southeast of Tactical Road
South, Nekoma, Cavalier County, ND”, Benjamin Halperin, Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/nd0046.photos.199338p/.

138

Figure 2: The Nike Family of missiles. Left to Right, Ajax, Hercules, Zeus. | Redstone Arsenal
Historical Information, U.S. Army,
http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/archives/nikefam/nike_family_02.jpg.
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Figure 3: Nike-Hercules missile on a launcher | Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, U.S.
Army, https://history.redstone.army.mil/miss/nike/hercphotos/herc_wsmr_1970_03.jpg.
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Figure 4: Nike family of missiles. Top to bottom, Zeus, Hercules, Ajax. | Redstone Arsenal
Historical Information, U.S. Army,
http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/archives/nikefam/nike_family_04.jpg.
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Figure 5: Nike-Zeus Acquisition Radar. The transmitter is the triangle in the foreground, and the
receiver is the hemisphere in the background. The transmitter had to be rotated physically which
limited the number of targets it could track and how rapidly it could re-scan them. | U.S. Navy
All Hands Magazine, January 1963, p. 8, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/27/2002122253/1/-1/1/ah196301.pdf.
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Figure 6: Nike-Zeus Target Tracking Radar on the left and Discrimination Radar on the Right at
White Sands Missile Range. | U.S. Army, http://www.wsmr-history.org/ZeusRadar1.htm.
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Figure 7: The Multifunction Array Radar or MAR developed as part of the Nike-X program at
White Sands Missile Range. | U.S. Army, SMDC/ARSTRAT Command Historian, 2017,
https://www.army.mil/article/186715/smdc_history_mar_milestone_demonstrates_radar_capabili
ties.
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Figure 8: The Perimeter Acquisition Radar or PAR developed as part of the Nike-X program. |
U.S. Army, USASMDC/ARSTRAT command historian, 2017,
https://www.army.mil/article/190736/smdc_history_par_conducts_initial_satellite_test.
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Figure 9: A test of the Sprint interceptor, October 28. 1970 at Kwajalein Atoll. | U.S. Army,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT Historical Office, 2015,
https://www.army.mil/article/157826/smdc_history_if_at_first_you_dont_succeed.
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Figure 10: A test of the Spartan Interceptor. | U.S. Army, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Command
Historian, 2017,
https://www.army.mil/article/194445/smdc_history_safeguard_achieves_full_operational_capabi
lity.
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Figure 11: Cannikin Test Area on Amchitka Island in Alaska, where the W-71 warhead was
tested. | Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory Archives,
https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8149/7597459378_bd4cde498e.jpg.

148

Figure 12: The Cannikin Device, containing the W-71 warhead, which was lowered into a nearly
two-kilometer-deep shaft to be tested on Amchitka Island, Alaska. | Courtesy of Los Alamos
National Laboratory Archives, https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8430/7597458904_385f8106ed.jpg.
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Figure 13: Models left to right, Spartan interceptor, Galosh interceptor, Minuteman III ICBM,
SS-9 ICBM (the first two stages were also used for the Soviet FOBS). | “Photographic copy of
photograph (original print in possession of CSSD-HO, Huntsville, AL). Photographer unknown.
View of rocket models, allowing a comparison of the Spartan, galosh (USSR), minute man III,
and SS-9 (USSR) missiles - Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex, Missile Launch Area,
Within Exclusion Area, Nekoma, Cavalier County, ND,” Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/nd0050.photos.199380p/.
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Figure 14: The Mickelson Safeguard Complex seen from above. | “7. Photographic copy of
photograph, date unknown (original print in possession of James E. Zielinski Earth Tech,
Huntsville, AL). Pan American World Airways, photographer. Aerial view (north to south) of
missile launch area. Warhead handling building can be seen at the bottom center of the picture
and the universal missile building in the middle right. In the distance can be seen the missile site
control building and related structures - Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex, Missile
Launch Area, Within Exclusion Area, Nekoma, Cavalier County, ND,” Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/nd0050.photos.199376p/.
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